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NEW ZEALAND'S NEW CENSORSHIP REGIME 
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In New Zealand, following an important censorship decision made under 
a new legislative regime in 1996, distributors of the overseas magazines 
'Knave', 'Ravers' and 'Two Blue' now employ individuals whose soul task 
is to examine such magazines after they enter the country, in order to 
carefully obscure with black felt pen identified harmful words contained 
within certain advertisements. This censorship decision is somewhat 
surprising, and it and others merit detailed examination. 
On 1 October 1994 New Zealand's new censorship regime became 
operational. On that date a previous tripartite system of classification of 
films, videos, and books and magazines was replaced by a streamlined, 
comprehensive classification system enforced and administered from one 
office (hereafter the Office), under the empowering legislative umbrella of 
the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993 (hereafter the 
Act). The Office has now been operating for over two years. This article 
examines the first twenty-four months of operation of the new regime to 1 
October 1996. This period must be acknowledged as somewhat unusual 
because not only have our censors been engaged in the first year in the 
routine of classification, including attempting to clear a backlog of material, 
but also in effectively setting up the Office itself, together with its 
administrative and management systems. A separate Board of Review, the 
body which can reclassify material classified by the Office on application by 
interested parties, has also been established. This article outlines the main 
concerns expressed prior to the instigation of the new regime and attempts to 
discern whether those concerns were justified. First, the initial appointments 
of censorship officers and members of the Board of Review are examined to 
determine what sort of appointees now undertake the task of censorship in 
New Zealand. Second, a selective study of important decisions of the Office 
and of the Board is presented to determine the manner in which both bodies 
are carrying out their duties.' Finally, the impact of the Bill of Rights on 
I would like to thank John Caldwell for his comments on a draft of this article, and Jeremy 
Hammington for his ongoing discourse. 
I Unless indicated, the summary of reasons for the decision on the Register has been used for 
analysis of decisions of the Office. Reg 35(l)(i) of the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Regulations 1994 (Reg 19941189) requires a summary to be included where 
the Act requires reasons to be given for a decision. Section 38 of the Act requires reasons 
where a publication has been submitted to the Office under ss 13 or 42 of the Act. This 
means that the only case where a summary of reasons is not given is where a film is 
submitted by the Labelling Body (which rates films at the unrestricted end of the spectrum) 
because it has already been restricted overseas, or because the Body is having difficulty in 
deciding on a rating. Reg 35(l)(k) allows any other particulars to be included in the 
Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 7, 19961 
these censorship decisions is analysed. It will become apparent that there has 
been an increase in material which is being banned or restricted by our 
censors. The Act has undoubtedly resulted in greater regulation of expression 
in New Zealand.' However, not all of this regulation can be justified under 
the Act. I conclude by offering some suggestions for reform. 
New Zealand now has a censorship regime which centers on a finding 
that material is 'objectionable'. S 3 of the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 provides: 
Meaning of "objectionable"- (1) For the purposes of this Act, a publication is 
objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such as 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the availability of the 
publication is likely to be injurious to the public good. 
(2) A publication shall be deemed objectionable for the purposes of this Act if the 
publication promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support,- 
(a) The exploitation of children, or young persons, or both, for sexual purposes; or 
(b) The use of violence or coercion to compel any person to participate in, or submit to, 
sexual conduct; or 
(c) Sexual conduct with or upon the body of a dead person; or 
(d) The use of urine or excrement in association with degrading or dehumanising 
conduct or sexual conduct; or 
(e) Bestiality; or 
(f) Acts of torture or the infliction of extreme violence or extreme cruelty. 
(3) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not any publication (other 
than a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) is objectionable or 
should be given a classification other than objectionable, particular weight shall be 
given to the extent and degree to which, and the manner in which, the publication- 
(a) Describes, depicts, or otherwise deals with- 
(i) Acts of torture, the infliction of serious physical harm, or acts of significant 
cruelty: 
(ii) Sexual violence or sexual coercion, or violence or coercion in association 
with sexual conduct: 
(iii) Other sexual or physical conduct of a degrading or dehumanising or 
demeaning nature: 
(iv) Sexual conduct with or by children, or young persons, or both: 
(v) Physical conduct in which sexual satisfaction is derived from inflicting or 
suffering cruelty or pain: 
(b) Exploits the nudity of children, or young persons, or both: 
(c) Degrades or dehumanises or demeans any person: 
(d) Promotes or encourages criminal acts or acts of terrorism: 
(e) Represents (whether directly or by implication) that members of any particular class 
of the public are inherently inferior to other members of the public by reason of any 
characteristic of members of that class, being a characteristic that is a prohibited ground 
of discrimination specified in section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
(4) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not any publication (other 
than a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) is objectionable or 
Register as the Office considers necessary or desirable. The Office includes additional 
information where it considers the matter is of significant public interest. In all cases where 
Board of Review decisions are referred to, the full decision has been used. 
2 It is not the intention of this article to examine or comment on the prior question of whether 
a censorship regime is desirable at all. The literature on this topic is both extensive and 
scholarly. For a sample see Freedom, Rights and Pornography: A Collection of Papers by 
Fred R Berger (ed Bruce Russell: 1991); Richard A Posner, Sex and Reason (1992); Nadine 
Strossen, Defending Pornography. Free Speech, Sex and the Fight for Women's Rights 
(1995). 
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should be given a classification other than objectionable, the following matters shall 
also be considered: 
(a) The dominant effect of the publication as a whole: 
(b) The impact of the medium in which the publication is presented: 
(c) The character of the publication, including any merit, value, or importance that the 
publication has in relation to literary, artistic, social, cultural, educational, scientific, or 
other matters: 
(d) The persons, classes of persons, or age groups of the persons to whom the 
publication is intended or is likely to be made available: 
(e) The purpose for which the publication is intended to be used: 
(0 Any other relevant circumstances relating to the intended or likely use of the 
publication. 
S 2 defines 'publication' as: 
(a) Any film, book, sound recording, picture, newspaper, photograph, photographic 
negative, photographic plate, or photographic slide: 
(b) Any print or writing: 
(c) Any paper or other thing- 
(i) That has printed or impressed upon it, or otherwise shown upon it, any word, 
statement, sign, or representation; or 
(ii) On which is recorded or stored any information that, by the use of any 
computer or other electronic device, is capable of being reproduced or shown as any 
word, statement, sign, or representation: 
The promotional material of the Office states that it is responsible for the 
classification of a wide range of material, including films, videos, 
magazines, computer discs, video games, CD-ROMs, T-shirts, posters and 
playing cards. Publications which promote or support, or tend to promote or 
support, the behaviours described in s 3(2) of the Act are automatically 
deemed to be likely to be injurious to the public good. Any other 
publications must be considered giving particular weight to other factors set 
out in s 3(3), which are the manner, extent and degree to which the 
publication describes, depicts or deals with matters such as torture, physical 
cruelty, acts of sexual violence, sexual acts with children, acts of a degrading 
or dehumanising nature or of a sado-masochistic character, or which 
represent a particular class of persons as inherently inferior. Not only are 
these indicators specified to assist our censors, but considerations which 
typically reflect liberal concerns about what 'good' things should shape our 
society must also be taken into account under s 3(4). Thus the character of 
the work, including any merit, value, or importance that the publication has 
in relation to literary, artistic, social, cultural, educational, scientific, or other 
matters, will be assessed. So too will the overall effect of the publication as a 
whole, the impact of the form in which the publication is presented, the 
likely or intended audience, and the purpose for which the publication is 
intended to be used. 
The Office has power to prohibit publications. It may also restrict a 
publication, to those of a certain age, to a special class of users, (such as a 
Film Festival audience), to a named individual, or for a specified purpose. It 
may require material to be cut for restricted or unrestricted release, or may 
classify the publication as unrestricted. It may impose conditions on public 
display of any publication using a 'likely to cause offence' test. There is a 
right of review by the Film and Literature Board of Review, and a right of 
appeal to the High Court on a point of law and on the same grounds then to 
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the Court of Appeal. Part VIII of the Act provides for offences of non- 
compliance, possession and supply, some of which are strict liability. 
Individuals may be fined or imprisoned and corporate bodies may be fined. 
The new classification regime is more specific, and hence recognised as 
being more prescriptive and stringent, than any of the three systems of 
control it r e p l a ~ e d . ~  The existence of strict liability offences was noted by the 
Minister of Women's Affairs on the introduction of the new legislation as 
significant in having a deterrent effect by requiring customers to think very 
carefully about the material they might purchase or possess.4 Whatever hopes 
opposing parties may hold about the regime must center on s 3 and its all- 
important classification criteria with their apparent focus on fetishist activity. 
Despite the greater specificity of the section, it contains at the same time key 
elements which are imprecise, as is the nature of any censorship legislation. 
The question of imprecision is considered below, but it should be noted first 
that this feature has also placed some emphasis on the character and 
experience of the personnel involved in administering the new classification 
system, because it is these public servants who must interpret the legislative 
provisions. 
111. QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERTISE 
There is no doubt that s 3 of the Act creates a number of statutorv 
discretions in our censors, who could have considerable ability to exercise 
personal judgment in relation to phrases such as 'likely to be injurious to the 
public good', 'promotes or supports or tends to promote or support', and 
'degrading or dehumanising or demeaning'. Such judgment could also enter 
into decisions about the character of publications and whether or not they 
have merit, value or importance in relation to literary, artistic, social, 
cultural, educational or scientific matters. One argument made is that these 
discretions are enhanced by s 4 of the Act, which provides that the censor is 
the expert authorised by the Act to decide whether or not a publication is 
objectionable, and that evidence going to that question is not e~sent ia l .~  
Further, under the Act, the appointments of the Chief and Deputy Censors, 
and the members of the Board of Review, have been made on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Internal Affairs with the concurrence of 
the Minister of Women's Affairs and the Minister of Justice. Previously the 
appointment process was at departmental level. Two conflicting concerns 
were expressed about this change. One commentator suggested that the new 
requirements could make the appointment process receptive to departmental 
directivesS6 Another suggested that the process is susceptible to the personal 
beliefs of the Minister of Internal Affairs and the feminist leanings of the 
then current Minister of Women's ~ f f a i r s . ~  These arguments may have been 
overstated. Some Ministers value their officials' advice and others do not. 
3 See Caldwell, 'Pornography - An Argument for Censorship' [I9921 5 Canterbury LR 171, 
201; Wrightson, 'Censorship in New Zealand', February 1994, an address to One Hundred 
and Fifty Ways of Loving (A multi-media groupshow addressing the Films, Videos and 
Publications Classification Act 1993); and Dugdale, 'Films Videos and Publications 
Classification Bill' (1993) NZLJ 16. 
4 See (1992) 532 NZPD 12761. 
5 Caldwell, op cit, above note 3, at 193. 
6 Williams, 'Feminist Considerations of Harm and the Censorship of Pornography' (1993) 7 
AULR 517.525. 
7 Dugdale, op cit, above note 3 at 17. For some reason, this commentator was not concerned 
that the personal views of the Minister of Justice could have some negative influence, but 
appeared to assume that they would, in fact, always balance those of the other Ministers. 
The criticism, if it has any validity, must apply across the board. 
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Some Ministers put aside their personal beliefs some of the time.' It would 
be fair to say that the MMP environment may balance the process somewhat 
if necessary. However, the initial appointment process has been carried out 
and the results can be examined to a limited extent. 
The first appointment process resulted in the appointment of Kathryn 
Paterson as Chief Censor, an Australian with considerable experience at 
federal level censoring Australian television, literature and films. The 
Deputy Censor, Lois Hutchinson, was previously New Zealand's Video 
Recordings Authority. Approximately ten Classification Officers were 
originally appointed to assist the Office (some positions were casual or part- 
time). The age range of officers was from the late twenties to mid-fifties. 
Individual biographical details are not available as the Office regards this as 
a privacy issue. However, it has advised that there was an ethnic and skills 
mix among the officers. Appointees came from both the public and private 
sector, some had legal training, some came from the previous censoring 
authorities, and others had backgrounds in nursing, and counselling. The 
Office advertised at the end of 1995 to fill further Classification Officer 
positions to deal with a backlog of work.' The advertisement sought 
applicants described as team players, possessing well balanced judgment, 
highly developed critical analysis and decision-making ability, and socially 
well informed. It emphasised that experience with legal interpretation andlor 
a tertiary qualification in a relevant social science field would be desirable, 
and that appointment is legally limited to three years with one possible 
extension. By October 1996, the Office had a total of twenty-four 
Classification Officers. Fifteen were women and nine were men. All are full- 
time positions except for two, both positions held by female officers, one 
part-time and one on a casual basis. 
The Film and Literature Board of Review was appointed in May 1995 
and met for the first time late in 1995. More details are forthcoming about its 
membership than for the Classification Office. The President of the Board is 
Sandra Moran, a principal of a Wellington law firm with considerable 
litigation and legal committee experience. Her Deputy is Bill Hastings, a 
senior academic at Victoria University and former member of both the Video 
Recordings Authority and the Indecent Publications Tribunal. The remaining 
members of the Board, described as at time of appointment, are Denese 
Henare, a Barrister and Solicitor with tribal affiliations to Ngati Hine, 
Ngapuhi, and previous experience with the Film Censorship Board of 
Review, Professor Margaret Bedggood, Dean and Professor of Law at the 
University of Waikato, Bernadine Pool, a JP with a BA in Sociology, Miles 
Rogers, Programme Director of Concert FM with a B. Music in Composition 
and thirty years experience in the radio and television industry, Stephen 
Danby, a drama producer, with experience in the arts, Pamela Meekings- 
Stewart, an independent film and video-producer and director, and Stephanie 
Miller, a registered nurse, documentary film maker and previous part-time 
censor with the Video Recordings Authority. 
It is impossible to discern departmental influence in the appointments, or 
to determine whether any of the major appointments in fact reflect the 
personal ideologies of any of the Ministers involved. Applicants are unlikely 
to include reference to 'fundamentalist Christian' or 'feminist zealot' in their 
8 For example, Justice Minister Doug Graham, in relation to defacto property rights law 
reform in 1996. 
9 See Annual Report of the Office of Film and Literature Classification 1995, 12, and Annual 
Report for 1996, 13-15. 
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Curriculum Vitaes. What can be discerned from the biographical detail 
overall is that there is significant legal expertise, and a range of apparently 
relevant skills, as is required to be taken into account by ss 80(4) and 93(5) 
of the Act. There is some ethnic mix, though possibly less for the Review 
Board than for the Office, as Maori, but not Pacific Island interests appear to 
be represented. It is unclear whether our growing Asian population is 
represented. Women currently outnumber men on both bodies, significantly 
so in the Office." The Board of Review unfortunately appears to have no 
South Island representative. 
A significant cause of concern is an apparent conflict of interest arising 
from the appointment of Sandra Moran as President of the Board of Review. 
Ms Moran also sits on the board of Independent Newspapers Limited, which 
dominates newspaper and magazine distribution throughout most of New 
Zealand. The Board considered this difficulty at its first meeting in 1995. Ms 
Moran advised that content of magazines is not a matter which ever comes 
before the Board of INL. The Board concluded that there was no potential 
for actual prejudice in a review. On the matter of conflict of interest 
generally, the Board has agreed that where a conflict of interest arises, the 
member in question is to excuse her or himself from a particular review. By 
October 1996, this procedure had only been exercised once, again in the case 
of Ms Moran. Ms Moran had acted as a legal representative for Truth for a 
number of years. She therefore excused herself from a review decision 
involving New Truth and TV Extra in 1996." While the situation is of some 
concern, the approach of the Board seems practicable. New Zealand has a 
small population base and its professional and business communities reflect 
this base. It is highly likely that those in experienced positions in the legal 
profession will also be involved to some degree in the business sector or may 
have clients whose business is publication of some sort. There is a limited 
pool of talent from which to draw appropriate Board members, and if a 
practical form of Chinese wall can be erected to avoid conflict of interest 
arising, it should be. Finally, the position of the President would indicate that 
any bias would result in less censorship, which does not appear to have 
occurred. 
However, the refusal of the Classification Office to provide details of the 
backgrounds of those appointed as censorship officers might be seen as more 
problematic. In fact the Office's argument that biographical details can be 
refused because they raise a privacy issue seems weak especially given that 
more CV information was made available for those appointed to the Board of 
Review. For the Office it could be argued that the latter positions were 
public appointments and those in the Office are ordinary civil servant 
positions. There are probably hundreds of civil servant appointments which 
affect our daily lives more than those of censorship officers. Yet there is no 
right to demand personal details of all of those individuals in order to 
determine whether personal biases might inform how civil servants go about 
their public duties. This must be correct since civil servants are expected to 
give independent neutral advice to the government of the day. However, the 
difficulty undoubtedly remains that the legislation grants to our censorship 
officers, whoever they are, significant discretion as to what forms of 
expression should be regulated. This is borne out by the growing body of 
10 6 : 3 on the Board of Review and 15 : 9 as to Classification Officers, translating to 17 : 9 if 
the Chief Censor and her Deputy are included. 
I I Decision 3/96, 26 June 1996. 
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censorship decisions, which do exhibit over-enthusiasm in some cases and 
arbitrariness in others. 
IV. DECISIONS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS 
1. General matters 
Decisions o f  the Office and Board o f  Review to the end o f  September 
1996 were examined to attempt to identify significant trends in the way our 
new censors approach the censoring task. Because s 3 o f  the Act contains a 
more rigorous breakdown o f  criteria to be used in determining whether a 
publication is objectionable, it is to be expected that the government's 
declared aim o f  toughening up the approach to pornography is reflected in 
decisions o f  the Office. The legislation should have resulted in regulation o f  
material which was not regulated before. A comparison o f  initial magazine 
classification decisions appears to bear this out. Caldwell has noted that in its 
latter years, the Indecent Publications Tribunal rarely banned homosexual 
publications outright. It considered that the sexually aroused male was 
always presented positively in pornography, in more equal roles, which was 
not the case with females." In other words, the approach taken was that it 
was less possible to dehumanise and demean men. However, an examination 
o f  the Classification Register for December 1995 reveals the Office, in 
dealing with a large batch o f  104 magazines aimed at the homosexual 
market, classified over half (59 )  as objectionable. Among the reasons given 
for the banning o f  this batch is reference to sexual and physical conduct o f  a 
degrading and demeaning nature, as set out in s 3 (3 )  o f  the Act. Even 
allowing for the possibility that the nature o f  gay pornography being 
submitted for censorship has become considerably more 'hard-core' within a 
short time, it appears the approach to homosexual pornography has definitely 
changed. 
Further, depictions of  forced urolagnia and a homosexual relationship 
between an uncle and nephew were borderline decisions o f  the Indecent 
Publications Tribunal given conditional age restrictions rather than banned 
outright." Contrastingly, under the Act, all depictions o f  the use o f  urine or 
excrement in association with degrading or dehumanising conduct or sexual 
conduct are objectionable i f  they promote or tend to promote the activity. 
Decisions made in June 1995 classified editions o f  the Australian magazine 
'Ribald' as objectionable on the grounds that the publication tended to 
promote and support the use o f  urine in association with both sexual and 
degrading conduct.'"urther, one o f  the grounds on which the gay magazines 
referred to above were banned outright under the new regime was because 
they promoted familial sexual relationships and sexual relationships that 
involved an implicit breach o f  trust." Therefore it seems likely that the 
borderline Tribunal decisions described above would be different today and 
the material would be unavailable in any form. 
However, it appears the Office has not gone as far as some suggested 
prior to the Act. Caldwell argued that the new criteria which define what 
material is objectionable can include depictions not only o f  the sexually 
12 Caldwell, op cit, above note 3, at 199-200. 
I3 Decision 116192, 15 December 1992. See Caldwell, op cit, above note 3, at 200. 
14 Eg Classification Register, December 199.5, OFLC Ref 9400147. 
I S  Section 3(2)(d) of the Act. Eg Classification Register, June 1995, OFLC Refs 245 and 318. 
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violent, but also of the merely sexually explicit.I6 The Office is not taking 
this strict approach. Material containing explicit displays of genitalia, 
including male genitalia, has tended to receive R18 restrictions." As to 
nudity per se, as depicted in naturist magazines, in the context of persuasion 
about the advantages of nudity and discussions of sexual issues, it was 
originally restricted by the Office to those of 16 years and over or who are 
accompanied by a parent or guardian.'8 However, this publication was passed 
unrestricted by the Board on review, on the grounds that it was a genuine 
publication presenting the naked human form in a natural and non-sexual, 
non-exploitative manner.I9 
In summary, although the body of decisions in the first two years of the 
new regime does not generally support the view that merely sexually explicit 
material would be more regulated, the overall impression is that the Office is 
censoring material which would not have been regulated under the old 
regime. This is enhanced by a closer look at interpretations given to the other 
criteria which make up theobjectionable test. - 
2. Likelihood of injury to the public good 
This phrase is used in s 3(1) of the Act to give a general description of 
objectionable publications: '... a publication is objectionable if it describes, 
depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such as sex, horror, crime, 
cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the availability of the publication 
is likely to be injurious to the public good'. The Register reveals little about 
how the Office views the nature of this test or its place in classification. In 
general, the phrase is referred to as simply following from a finding that the 
publication in question is objectionable because it falls within the categories 
of 3(3) having taken the matters in 3(4) into account.20 
However, the Board of Review made very clear in its first decision that 
the phrase comprises a separate element which has to be ~atisfied.~'  The 
Board adopted a definition from a previous Indecent Publications Tribunal 
decision22 that injury to the public good is "anything which interferes with 
the social contract in a way that upsets harmony, or equality and mutual 
respect for others, or the sanctity of life, or physical or mental freedom or 
both". Clearly this goes to harm rather than offensiveness. Further, the 
requirement of likelihood was interpreted to mean more than a mere perhaps, 
and the likelihood must be one of discernible or actual injury (though this 
goes to quantum, and is not a hard proof requirement). The Board has held 
that publications meet this criteria if they upset mutual respect for others by 
reinforcing negative attitudes towards women amongst the men for whom 
the publication is intended.23 The potential to reinforce negative male 
attitudes towards women amongst more impressionable male teenagers has 
also been found injurious to the public good, justifying R18  restriction^.'^ 
Further, the dissemination of misleading sexual health information in a video 
has been held to have great potential to upset the sanctity of life and health, 
16 Caldwell, op cit, above note 3, at 201. 
I7 Eg the magazines 'Erotic Film X Guide'. 'Pacific Links No 7' (both June 1995, OFLC Refs 
229 and 2%), and 'Playgirl August 1994', (August 1995, OFLC Ref 9400841). 
18 Classification Register. December 1995. OFLC Ref 9400900-1. 
19 Decision 2/96, 9 April 1996. 
20 Eg Classification Register, December 1995, OFLC Refs 9400973 and 9400190. 
21 Decision 1/95, 'D.P. Women', 20 December 1995. 
22 Decision 80192, 'Re Shiny and others'. 
23 Decision 1/95; Decision 7/96. 
24 Decisions 2 and 3/95. 
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thereby satisfying the test." Scenes in the film 'Seven' also justified an R18 
restriction on the basis of injury to the public good. They were held to be 
likely to inure more impressionable young minds to the effects of ~iolence. '~  
But the test was not met by the mere possibility of misinterpretation of 
naturist magazines," and where women were depicted as autonomous sexual 
human beings consenting to being filmed having sex, no negative social 
message was seen to be promoted.2x 
Importantly, the Board has held that the 'likely to be injurious to the 
public good' test does not apply when a publication falls within s 3(2). The 
Board considered the links between the subsections in s 3 in Decision 3/96, 
the New Truth deci~ion.~ '  It held that full effect must be given to the deeming 
provision in subsection (2) without any consideration of the content and 
context criteria contained in subsections (3) and (4), or the injury to the 
public good test in subsection (1): 
This interpretation carves out of the umbrella definition in subsection (1) publications 
deemed to be objectionable because they promote, support or tend to promote or support 
the activities listed in subsection (2). Consistent with the opening words of subsections 
(2), (3) and (4), the censor is not to have regard to the criteria in subsections (I) ,  (3) and 
(4) when considering a publication to which subsection (2) applies. Only when the 
censor decides that a publication does not promote, support or tend to promote or 
support the activities listed in subsection (2) can the censor go on to consider 
subsections (3) and (4). 
Therefore the Board concluded a publication which falls within s 3(2) is 
deemed to be objectionable and its availability is deemed to injure the public 
good. The Board thought that to read the subsection (3) and (4) criteria into 
subsection (2) would destroy the deeming provision in the latter and render it 
the same as subsections (3) and (4). It would destroy the two-tier 
classification system within the section, which the Board considered 
parliament has intended should operate to ban some publications on the basis 
of specific content, while the rest are dealt with by way of an exercise of 
judgment by our censors guided by the criteria in subsections (3) and (4). In 
reaching this decision, the Board rejected two other interpretations of how 
the parts of s 3 might work: that in dealing with subsection (2) the censor is 
also required to apply the subsection (1) test that the availability of the 
publication must be injurious to the public good; and that the content and 
context criteria in subsections (3) and (4) must also be applied to subsection 
(2). 
The matter is not free from doubt, but there is some support for the 
Board's view in significant statements made during the passage of the Bill 
which eventually became the Act. The introductory speech of the Minister of 
Social Welfare noted the test in subsection (1) but went on to note that ... 
'one category of material is marked for prohibition on its own terms'." 
Further, though the report of the Department of Justice on the Bill prepared 
for the Select Committee states that: 'The ultimate standard for prohibition is 
that a publication is "likely to be injurious to the public good" (subclause 
(I)) ' ,  it goes on to describe subclause 2's listed matters as 'material 
25 Decision 1/95. 
26 Decision 1/96. 
27 Decision 2/96. 
28 Decision 8/96. 
29 Affirmed in Decisions 4 - 6/96. 
30 (1992) 532 NZPD 12759. 
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automatically prohibited'." Both these statements imply that s 3(2) stands 
and operates on its own, without reference to any test in s 3(1). As to the 
effects of subsections 3(3) and (4), the explanatory note of the Bill as 
introduced describes these clauses as setting out 'criteria that arc to be taken 
into account in determining whether or not any publication (other than a 
publication that is deemed by clause 3(2) to be objectionable) is 
objectionable or should be given any other classification'. This implies that s 
3(2) is to operate independently also of any requirements in the later 
subsections. Finally, the Board's view does make logical sense of the 
wording in s 3. Section 3(1) states a general test of what is objectionable. 
Section 3(2) deems certain things to be objectionable for the purposes of the 
Act, implying that the requirements of s 3(1) and indeed, any other 
subsection, must be assumed to be met. Sections 3(3) and 3(4) are prefaced 
by the words 'In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not 
any publication (other than a publication to which subsection ( 2 )  of this 
section applies) is objectionable . . .'. The words in italics can only mean that 
the matters in subsections (3) and (4) can have no bearing on subsection (2), 
because it has already performed its function of assigning deemed 
objectionability. 
Therefore the New Truth review decision appears to give coherence to 
the various parts of s 3 of the Act. However, it does also leave a clear 
impression that the censor does not have to exercise any judgment in relation 
to s 3(2). This is inaccurate. Indeed, in the New Truth decision itself, the 
Board proceeded to exercise a great deal of discretion using the subsection. 
The outcome is questionable and illustrates one of the main weaknesses in 
the legislation. It  also has Bill of Rights implications. Both aspects are 
discussed in more detail below.32 
3. Promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support 
The view given some currency prior to the passing of the Act that a new 
category of automatically banned material was created in s 3(2) was 
incorrect. Total prohibition of material containing the specific activities 
described in the subsection could only follow if the publication promoted or 
supported, or tended to promote or support the activities shown. Pure 
description or depiction was not enough. Therefore the inflexibility created 
by the list of behaviours in s 3(2) is offset by the flexibility of the 'promotes 
or supports' test. At the same time, the latter takes the full weight of the 
censorship decision. This has resulted in strained meanings and arbitrariness 
in some cases. 
How has the promotion requirement been interpreted? The threshold is a 
low one. For example, the Office has produced a consistent series of very 
strict decisions about the exploitation of children or young persons for sexual 
purposes, as set out in s 3(2)(a) of the Act. A common theme of pornography 
involves depictions of women who are clearly of age or who are known to be 
of age, dressed up as schoolgirls for sexual titillation - school-girl fantasies. 
For example, the video 'Tickled and spanked"' contained sexualised 
presentations of adult females dressed and acting like school girls. This was 
found to be the sexualised presentation of young persons, intended to 
31 Report of the Department of Justice on the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification 
Bill, prepared for the Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee, 24 May 
1993 3 
- - - - , - . 
32 See section 3 and Part V below. 
33 Classification Register, December 1995, OFLC Ref 950 1856 
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sexually arouse the viewer, and as such, to support and tend to promote the 
exploitation of young persons for sexual purposes. Section 3(2)(a) applies 
even where the material presents a very obvious fantasy situation involving 
activities which would clearly be illegal if real children were involved. The 
video 'The Baby Clinic', where an adult female actor was presented as a 
small child, engaging in sexual activity with a ~a re -g ive r ,~~  is an example. 
Similarly, sexually explicit depictions of children's film characters shown for 
adult sexual arousal were held to be objectionable because they connected 
adult sexual activity with children's play." Therefore, the fact that no real 
minors are actually involved in creating these depictions, or are very 
obviously not involved, does not prevent the material being held to promote 
and support sexual activity with young persons or minors. 
This interpretation of the criteria in s 3(2)(a) is misunderstood. In 
November 1995 the Office classified eleven of twelve computer disks 
containing material downloaded from internet computer newsgroups and 
bulletin boards as objectionable." Some of the material comprised pictures of 
bestiality and descriptions of sex among teenagers and sub-teenagers. The 
Office rejected some other material on the grounds that 'the women all 
appear to be in their late teens. The female models are presented as young 
due to their youthful facial features, shaved pubic area and by having their 
hair tied with ribbons or ponytails as in the style worn by young female 
children'." A factor noted in the decisions was that some of the models 
depicted had the word 'Seventeen' on their clothing. The submitter argued 
that this referred to a title of a European magazine which carried a disclaimer 
that all its models were over eighteen in fact, and that a person is not a child 
or young person in legal terms in New Zealand if they are over seventeen. 
Such arguments overlook the fact that the Act deliberately omits to tie the 
description 'young person' to any legal definition based on age. In fact, there 
is no definition at all, in order to allow the Office to avoid technical 
arguments about the actual age of persons depicted. The focus of the 
provision is on the character of a portrayal of a child or younger person, 
rather than the question of the real age of the actor or model, which in many 
cases could never be ascertained. The effect of such decisions is clearly 
contentious, as it covers what some argue are merely harmless fantasies. 
The same criteria have also been used by the Office to censor a T-shirt.'" 
The item of apparel depicted babies in cartoon form. A female baby was 
shown with a dummy in her vagina and a look of enjoyment on her face. A 
male baby nearby had a thought bubble over his head with the word 'Bitch!' 
in it. This depiction was considered to tend to promote and support the 
exploitation of children for sexual purposes, particularly because the T-shirt 
was a form of accessible communication to the public. The T-shirt was 
classified objectionable under s 3(2) of the Act. Arguably the decision is 
wrong. While in extreme bad taste, highly offensive and sexist, it is 
questionable that such a depiction can be said to actually promote, or tend to 
promote or support the exploitation of children for sexual purposes. The 
decision is footnoted with a reference to 1993 statistics of victims of sexual 
abuse under the age of 16 and a note that numbers increased 1% in 1994. 
34 Classification Register, December 1995, OFLC Ref 9501 846. 
35 Classification Register, June 1995, OFLC Ref 458. 
36 Classification ~egis ter ,  November 1995, OFLC Refs 9400906, 9400909,9400912, 9400915, 
9400916,9400919,9400926-29,9400943,9400945. 
37 Posting on Newsgroup: cantva nz.org.isocnz:258 by the submitter, Stephen Bell 
(ahaz@atlantis.atrix.gen.nz), 24 November 1995. 
38 Classification Register, March 1996, OFLC Ref 9500688 (full decision). 
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There is no reference to how many of these were attributable to vulgar T- 
shirts. The function of the T-shirt as a statement-making form of apparel was 
also treated as crucial. The full decision states: 
The cartoon is large, filling most of the front of the T-shirt, and is boldly drawn with 
simple strokes effecting the stylised images. The print is large and is in bold capitals. 
The T-shirt is otherwise blank, having nothing to distract from the image. This style of 
cartoon is simplified for maximum impact on the viewer, enabling a striking, immediate 
interpretation, which is easily communicated at a glimpse . ... T-shirts which feature 
images on the front andlor back are customarily interpreted as communicative 
39 
statements . . . 
The task of censorship in this case appeared to involve an element of 
pop-psychology as well as a degree of evangelicalism. But more importantly, 
this feature of the decision demonstrates how context can be read in to the 
'promotes and supports' test, though there is no provision for it in the Act. 
Examination of style, impact and ease of communication is analogous to 
examining the dominant effect of the publication as a whole, one of the 
context criteria specified in s 3(4)(a) as a matter to be considered in 
classifying publications falling outside s 3(2). This interpretation of s 3(2) 
does not comply with the earlier approach of the Office nor with the Board's 
New Truth decision made three months after the T-shirt decision. The 
banning of the piece of clothing was presented as something of a novelty by 
the media in New Zealand. No doubt the public was surprised that apparel 
which can be found openly in joke shops and gift shops which sell adult gifts 
could in fact be illegal. 
The inflexibility of s 3(2), and the flexibility of the 'promotes and 
supports' test, has been illustrated most clearly in the Board's review of the 
Office's R18 classification of the weekly newspaper, New Truth and TV 
Extra.40 The Board found the publication to be objectionable and banned it 
outright because it contained 18 small advertisements within 11 pages of 
advertisements for sexual services. The objectionable advertisements 
covered escorts, videos and personals, and contained words such as 
'schoolboy', 'student', and 'schoolgirl' which the Board considered referred 
to the exploitation of young persons for sexual purposes; and words such as 
'golden shower', 'brown shower' and 'water sports', which the Board 
considered indicated the use of urine or excrement in association with sexual 
conduct. The Board held that if the publication promoted, supported or 
tended to promote or support these activities as listed in s 3(2), it had no 
choice but to find it objectionable. The Board avoided arguments about the 
different meanings which could be attributed to the words. It concluded the 
test was not what the words 'promote' or 'support' meant in a theoretical 
dictionary sense, but simply 'when does a publication promote or support an 
activity?' The newspaper was found to so promote or tend to promote or 
support the activities advertised because the Board decided editors and 
publishers have a choice about what advertisements to accept. In this case, 
by publishing, at the very least they tended to support the activities. This was 
in spite of the fact that the advertisements were contained within a section of 
the newspaper which only took up a quarter of its pages, and did not in fact 
fill those pages. The Board considered it could not look for the dominant 
effect of the publication as a whole, as it could if s 3(3) applied, but only to 
whether the entire publication promoted or supported the activities. Clearly a 
39 OFLC Ref 9500688, March 1996, at 3. 
40 Decision 3/96, 26 June 1996. See Section 2 above. 
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few advertisements would hardly produce a dominant effect. However, 
because of the view the Board took of the function of newspaper editors, it 
held it was possible for a few small advertisements to indicate that the entire 
publication promoted or supported the activities. 
The Board acknowledged the heavy-handedness of this decision. Its 
practical effect in terms of exposure of the public to objectionable material is 
nil, as the edition in question was published in November 1994. However as 
a result of the decision, editors and publishers within New Zealand will have 
to take responsibility for the advertising content of their publications, 
although the Board did admit the possibility of some sort of oversight 
argument where one advertisement slipped through. The Board was at pains 
to emphasise that the mandatory nature of s 3(2) left it no choice but to make 
this classification. It also pointed out that all of the activities described in s 
3(2) are unlawful in New Zealand except the use of urine or excrement in 
association with sexual activity. 
The decision is problematic. It is unclear how far the Board's reasoning 
will extend. The Board notes that publications do not just appear, they have 
publishers and editors. It states: 
The content and form of a publication is the direct result and a clear reflection of that 
publication's editorial policy. If a newspaper publishes an advertisement, it must be 
taken to promote or support, or tend to promote or support, the content of that 
advertisement because the editor and publisher had the power to make a decision not to 
publish it. Because an editor could reject an advertisement, by accepting it, her 
publication must be taken as at least tending to promote or support the content of the 
advertisement." 
Similarly, books and films do not just appear. They have writers, editors 
and publishers. Therefore arguably Nabokov's ' ~o l i t a ' "  could fall foul of s 
3(2) simply because an editor and a publisher had the power to decide that 
the book should contain material which takes a positive view of the 
exploitation of children or young persons for sexual purposes. 
Further, it appears the decision turned on an unrealistic view of editorial 
control. In fact, the editors of books and films have far more control over 
content than busy editors running commercial weekly newspapers and 
magazines who largely leave their advertisement sections to run themselves. 
The law of defamation recognises limited defences for newspaper editors and 
publishers for innocent dissemination of libels, and in relation to articles 
containing comment not that of the publication,42 based on a realistic view of 
the process of publication of commercial periodicals. But even if editors and 
publishers can be expected to closely monitor their advertising sections, they 
face the difficulty that until material is classified by the Office, it is not 
objectionable. Publication deadlines mean that newspapers will prefer to 
refuse to accept advertisements rather than obtain legal opinions about their 
status or a classification decision from the Office itself. The decision must 
therefore have a significant chill factor, and may result in loss of advertising 
revenue, threatening the commercial base of newspapers. This has Bill of 
Rights implications. 
41 Decision 3/96, at 14. 
42 Banned under the Indccent Publications Act 1910 in 1960. The outcry caused by this 
decision led to major reform of New Zcaland censorship in  the form of the Indecent 
Publications Act 1963. See P Christoffel, Censored: A short history of censorship in New 
Zealand (1989), at 24. 
43 See ss 10 and 2 1 of the Defamation Act 1992. 
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Finally, it can well be argued of editorial pages that the content and 
comments there contained are the views of a newspaper's editor or publisher, 
but this seems less convincing of an advertisement section. The Board seems 
to be suggesting that a newspaper supports abortion if it advertises abortion 
clinics, gambling if it publishes advertisements for racemeets and lotto, and 
alcoholism and drunk driving if it advertises the sale of beer, wine and 
spirits. Extrapolating from the Board's finding would suggest that the 
publisher of an 'Exchange and Mart' type of publication devoted completely 
to all sorts of advertising is to be taken to promote or support all of the 
activities there presented for sale simply through the act of placing the ad. In 
fact, some of the activities advertised may actually negate each other - for 
example, an advertisement for a SPUC meeting would appear to be 
diametrically opposed to one advertising abortion or family planning clinics. 
Such important context could not be taken into account for the purposes of 
classification. However. if it was decided such a vublication did not in its 
entirety promote or support the activities advertised, the resulting decision 
would be a nonsense. A publication containing contradictory advertisements 
would escape the censor's net. Such a result would encourage publishers to 
develop a form of 'bane and antidote' approach similar to that which avoids 
published words being found defamatory, by printing advertisements or 
notices disclaiming support for any apparently objectionable advertisements 
accepted from sources outside the publication. The reality ignored by the 
Board is that the producer or manufacturer or provider of services promotes 
their product, and the newspaper or other publication merely provides the 
medium in which to promote. Advertising pages can be seen as neutral 
spaces, providing no more than an opportunity to communicate, like a 
bulletin board or a shop window. 
The New Truth decision is being appealed to the High Court. Because the 
Board applied its reasoning in three further decisions to twelve magazines,44 
those decisions are also being appealed. In those cases the Board read in the 
reasoning in the New Truth decision as integral to its findings that the 
magazines should be deemed objectionable under s 3(2), rather than subject 
to R18 classification and restricted display as imposed by the Office. Though 
some photographs are mentioned, these review decisions centred largely on 
the carrying of advertisements in the magazines. The focus therefore is on 
the words used in the advertisements, in particular on what the Board 
described as coded words. In the decision dealing with three editions of the 
magazine 'Knave', the Board cites advertisements for videos and phone sex 
using words such as 'amber', 'yellow', 'porcelain' and 'watersports' as code 
words for the use of urination with sexual content. It cites references to 'head 
girl', 'College sex' and 'Innocent and Tender' as advertising the exploitation 
of young persons for sexual purposes. The two other decisions on the 
magazines 'Two Blue' and 'Ravers' are similarly focussed. In each case, the 
Board held that the inclusion of the advertisements, no matter how small, 
meant the publications promoted, supported or tended to promote or support 
the activities advertised, which came within s 3(2), and were therefore 
deemed objectionable. There was therefore no need to consider display 
conditions. 
The question of context and s 3(2) continues to give difficulty. Although 
in the New Truth decision the Board suggested a form of inadvertence 
defence based on the inclusion of one advertisement which has 'slipped past' 
44 Decisions 4, 5 and 6/96: 'Knave' Vol 26 Nos 2, 3, and 4; 'Two Blue' Vol 1, Nos 1, 2, 3 and 
4; 'Ravers' Vol 1, Nos 1 , 2 , 3  and 4; 'Ravers Clean Shaven Special Issue 1'. 
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a vigilant editor, the extent and workability of this defence is unclear. In the 
later Decision 6/96 the Board did not have to address the issue because more 
than one advertisement was involved. However, it was clearly conscious of 
the difficulties inherent in defending the position it has taken. Noting the 
existence of concerns about banning an entire issue on the basis of one 
advertisement, it stated: 
We note however, that if the inclusion of such an advertisement is not demonstrably an 
oversight, and judging by the context in which it appears, is consistent with the general 
editorial policy of the magazines, then it is indeed possible that one advertisement could 
indicate that the publication promotes supports or tends to promote or support one of the 
matters listed in s 3(2). 
This must be wrong. Having clearly rejected the use of any contextual 
test in relation to s 3 ( 2 )  in the New Truth decision, the Board appears to be 
arguing that nevertheless, context can be used to determine whether one 
advertisement can cause a publication to meet the promote or supports test. 
Furthermore, it appears unlikely that the 'defence' will be of any practical 
use, but in any event, its basis is arbitrary. If there has been genuine 
inadvertence, then the number of advertisements which are mistakenly 
published is irrelevant. 
The New Truth decision about advertisements, and its companion 
decisions, are therefore internally inconsistent. Their effect is that words are 
now regarded as more lethal than pictures. Pictures of female models 
spreading their labia for the viewer and in contorted positions emphasising 
their genitals," and moving images on video showing ejaculation on 
women's faces" are available (though restricted), while newspapers and 
magazines containing a few small text advertisements which use words such 
as 'porcelain', 'golden sprinkle', and 'schoolgirl', are not. This seems out of 
all proportion to apparent harm. It therefore has Bill of Rights implications 
which are discussed below." The decisions have also had undesirable effects 
on overseas publications. The views of the Board can have no effect on 
overseas editors and publishers and the advertisements they choose to accept. 
'Knave' magazine, for example, is published in the United Kingdom. As 
no ted , '~o l lowing  discussion with the Office, the distributors of the 
magazines 'Knave', 'Ravers' and 'Two Blue' now employ individuals whose 
soul task is to examine such magazines after they enter the country, in order 
to carefully obscure identified harmful words with black felt pen. This does 
not seem to comply with the total ban imposed in the New Truth decision, 
which held that advertisements could taint an entire publication. Such 
measures may avoid the imposition of state censorship, but more probably 
have the greatest effect of calling attention to the advertisements in question 
and emphasising the unfortunate contrast of what we are now allowed to see 
and what we are not. 
4. Art and the promotes and supports test 
It is unlikely that 'Lolita', a literary work mentioned above," would in 
fact be found by our censors to offend against the Act. A great deal of effort 
is taken to ensure that art and literature do not fall foul of s 3(2). In contrast 
45 Dccision 2/95, magazine 'Lipatick 10'. 
46 Decision 8/96, video 'The Voyeur #2'. 
47 See Part V below. 
48 See Introduction above. 
49 See Section 3 above. 
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to the New Truth decision, a less strict application of the 'promotes and 
supports' requirement is illustrated by three decisions about the photographic 
works of Robert ~applethorpe,~'  where the question whether works of art 
would be inappropriately caught in New Zealand's new censorship net arose. 
The photographs in question showed the use of urine associated with sexual 
conduct, and acts of torture and the infliction of extreme cruelty, as aspects 
of gay and sado-masochistic sexual subculture, in a manner which the Office 
stated it found both confronting and difficult. The conduct was clearly within 
the 'deemed objectionable' category of s 3(2) unless the publications did not 
promote and support or tend to promote or support the activities shown. In 
determining this, the Office gave weight to expert opinion in the submissions 
which argued that the photographs were significant works of art, 
notwithstanding the content. Again, this in itself would be insufficient under 
s 3(2) if these significant works of art still promoted or supported the 
activities themselves. However, the Office found that it was the art of 
Mapplethorpe being supported in the photographs, not the activities. 
Therefore the works were classified as objectionable except if availability 
was restricted to persons of eighteen years and over. 
The ~ a ~ ~ l e t h o r ~ e  decisions create a strained delineation between what 
promotes and what merely depicts. Much has been written about the work of 
Mapplethorpe and whether he created real art, a question which cannot be 
answered in the context of this article. However, i? is reasonable to assume 
that if the photographs had not been found to be art, the question of whether 
or not they promoted or supported the activities depicted would not have 
assumed such national importance, nor would it have-been necessary for the 
Office to confront arguments about what the function of fine art is. The 
question which followed from a liberal desire not to censor art, of what 
Mapplethorpe intended by his art, remains unanswered. The Office reasoned 
that the works did not promote or support the activities shown, but merely 
held up for display aspects of a minority subculture. Although 'tends to 
support' was acknowledged as a low test, the censor concluded that the 
publications did not have the purpose of promoting the use of urine in 
association with degrading or dehumanising conduct or sexual conduct. Nor 
was it seen as likely that they would have the effect of acting as an 
encouragement to the use of urine in association with this conduct, when 
viewed as art by reasonable members of the public. This reasoning is 
consistent with that used by the Office earlier in 1995 to classify the book by 
German Celant on Mapplethorpe which was published as a catalogue for the 
photographic exhibition, and contained copies of the photographs themselves 
together with text providing historical and biographical interpretation of the 
artist's work." After discussing the text accompanying the photograph 
involving urination, the censor noted that the book quotes Mapplethorpe 
discussing his experience of urination as a sexual expression as being 
'pleasurable', and his opinion of the complexity of sexuality. The discussion 
was described as candid, and, whilst not condemning the practice, neither 
was the discussion considered to promote or support it in any way. 
Such interpretations are subtle and borderline. There is a strong school of 
thought which maintains that Mapplethorpe used his abilities to force 
mainstream audiences to confront and accept gay subculture, or to at least 
see it presented in a positive light. Richard Marshall argues that: 
50 Classification Register, December 1995, OFLC Refs 9501765, 9501766 and 9501767 (full 
decisions). 
51 Classification Register, August 1995, OFLC Ref 9501017. 
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... The group identified as sadomasochistic represented both a type of sexual behaviour 
and an adopted style or attitude - often associated with leather and bondage. 
~ a ~ ~ l e t h o r p e  was a sympathetic participant in this group. He felt it was worthy, 
legitimate, previously unexplored, and an almost obligatory subject for him to treat. He 
approached it not as a voyeur but as an advocate, wanting to instil through his 
photographs dignity and beauty to a subject that was outside the accepted norms of 
behavio~r.'~ 
On this view it can clearly be argued that Mapplethorpe's work promotes 
and supports the gay activities he depicted - he could hardly be described as 
neutral. In any event, to suggest that it is only the art of Mapplethorpe which 
is being supported by his photographs seems trite and empty of meaning - 
arguably all examples of an artist's work support that artist's body of work 
generally. Further, the seemingly contrived view that Mapplethorpe's work 
promotes something other than what he depicted was in fact unnecessary to 
the classification decision because an aesthetic argument, standard within 
artistic criticism, that the works merely held up for display aspects of a 
minority subculture, was accepted by the Office. Therefore it did not matter 
what else, if anything, was promoted or supported. 
But at the very least, it can be strongly argued that Mapplethorpe's work 
both promoted itself (and in terms of shock value, the sado-masochistic 
works certainly did this), and the activities depicted. In contrast to the 
Mapplethorpe decisions, the Office classified the book 'Diva Obsexion' as 
objectionable as tending to support a theme of sadistic force against 
women." The book discussed sadism directed towards women in an 
historical and geographical context. However, the 'tends to support' test was 
met because the book was seen as endorsing the images contained in it as 
being legitimate modes of social entertainment. Yet Mapplethorpe's work at 
the least presents practices of gay subculture as legitimate modes of sexual 
expression, but did not satisfy the 'tends to support' test. 
In the New Truth and Mapplethorpe decisions, the Board and the Office 
had to wrestle with the inflexibility created by the list of sexual behaviours 
contained in s 3(2). While the provision is a step short of automatic 
prohibition on the grounds of subject-matter alone, the only method of 
avoiding a complete ban lies in arguing that the material does not promote or 
support what it shows or describes. Where work which is accepted to have 
artistic or literary merit is being examined, there will always be a strong 
desire to avoid automatic prohibition. It can always be said of such works 
that they promote the work of the author or creator. In contrast to this, where 
advertisements for sexual services which appear in publications seen to have 
no artistic or cultural merit are examined, there will be a strong desire to 
exercise control. And it can always be said of such material that it literally 
promotes the activities by advertising them. The result is a self-serving 
process where it seems the 'promotes and supports' test is being defined by 
what our censors consider desirable and moral already instead of being 
applied in any coherent, predictable way. In other words, the 'promotes and 
supports test', which, because it imports discretion, can be seen as both a 
strength and a weakness in the legislation, allows our censors to pick and 
choose the material they wish to regulate. We therefore have a censorship 
regime which allows arbitrary results. It has produced arbitrary results. In 
part this reflects the fact that it is never possible to have clear and consistent 
52 Richard Marshall, "Mapplethorpe's Vision", in R Marshall, Robert Mapplethorpe (1988), 
14. 
53 Classification Register, November 1995, OFLC Ref 9400568. 
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censorship law to begin with if we also want to preserve liberal art and 
culture. When a legal system attempts to reflect pluralism, it must give up 
any claim to certainty. The question then becomes what level of uncertainty 
is acceptable. A Bill of Rights assists in answering this question. 
5. Degrading, dehumanising or demeaning depictions 
For material outside the 'deemed objectionable' categories in s 3(2) of the 
Act, s 3(3) requires decision-makers to give particular weight to the way in 
which certain subject matter is treated or persons are portrayed. Section 3(3) 
(a)(iii) refers to the extent and degree to which, and the manner in which, the 
publication describes, depicts or otherwise deals with sexual or physical 
conduct of a degrading or dehumanising or demeaning nature, and s 3(3)(c) 
to the publication degrading or dehumanising or demeaning any person. It 
was argued that this clause could be used by extremist appointees holding 
either arch-conservative or radical feminist values to cast the net of 
censorship ever-wider to ban even mere depictions of human nudity and 
sexual intercour~e.'~ The Justice Department also opposed the use of the 
word 'demeaning' when reporting on the Bill because it was seen to have a 
general and weak meaning of belittling or lowering the dignity of a person. 
This was regarded as too imprecise to be of use." However, the word was 
added to s 3(3) at the Committee stage of the Bill, bolstering arguments that 
the subsection could be misused to ban explicit sexual depictions outright, 
and perhaps to ban gay erotica which some people see as repulsive in itself. 
What have our censors been doing with these subsections? The 
Classification Register shows they have been applied by the Office to three 
clear categories of material: depictions involving lack of consent, enjoyment 
or involvement, depictions of the verbal punishment of a participant, or 
publications which reduce the participants to a collection of mere body 
parks6 Unsurprisingly, consent and enjoyment features strongly in the 
54 Dugdale, op cit, above note 3, at 17. Contrastingly, Caldwell does not see this possibility as 
a bad thing. 
" 
55 Report of the Department of Justice on the Films, Videos and Publications Classification 
Bill, May 1993, 10. 
56 For example, explicit sexual depictions of women on playing cards (vacant and passive 
expressions and controlled positioning) Classification Register, January 1995, De Luxe 
Playing Cards with Sucking (no reference number); a scene in a video showing double 
uenetration (a degrading focus on the woman's discomfort and lack of active uarticipation 
in the sexual acti;ity) ~Tassification Register, April 1995, Video 'Stiff compe6tion li', (no 
reference number); part of the sound track of the same video of crowd noise (a sex 
competition in which a group of women compete to bring their male partners to ejaculation 
watched by a large exclusively male audience shouting comments such as 'bitch' and 'fuck 
that ass' directed at the women); a video dominated by strongly sexualised, though 
unrealistic depictions of women being tortured, (the association of particular activities with 
punishment and humiliation and the sexualisation of women's discomfort and struggling) 
Classification Register, June 1995, OFLC 882, Video 'White Slavery'; a scene in a video 
showing a woman telling a man during a telephone conversation to humiliate another 
woman and then to have sex with her (promotes the degrading treatment of women as a 
legitimate part of sexual activity) Classification Register, July 1995, OFLC 9500357, Video 
'Domination'; a depiction of males masturbating and ejaculating over a prone woman's face 
while talking over her in a degrading and dehumanising manner and extended close focus 
shots of multiple penetration of a female (reducing her to a collection of orifices) 
Classification Register, March 1995, Video 'Harry Horndog Double Penetration Special' 
(no reference number); a scene of a man giving a woman an enema (prolonged, detailed 
depiction, close focus of the woman's buttocks and the water expelled intensifies the 
degrading and demeaning nature of the depiction) Classification Register, November 1995, 
OFLC 9500441, Video 'Bittes Latex No 2'; a scene where a man pulls and holds a woman's 
hair in order to manipulate her to perform the actions he dictates and positions her to 
ejaculate on her face, Classification Register, August 1996, OFLC 9600298, Video 'Lust 
Runner'. The words in brackets are those used by the censorship officer to describe why the 
publication is degrading, dehumanising or demeaning. 
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determination of whether or not a person has been degraded, dehumanised or 
demeaned. Thus, group sex where the sexual activity presents as consensual 
and mutually enjoyed by all participants was objectionable only in the hands 
of those under eighteen years of age.57 But the video 'Various Japanese 
Hidden Cameras' containing scenes of women filmed unawares in public 
places undressing, washing and using toilets, was classified as objectionable, 
the emphasis in the decision being on the lack of consent which thus 
rendered the film voyeuristic, and degrading to the women concerned 
because it violated their personal privacy.58 
All of the examples footnoted above involve activities which were seen to 
be degrading to females, and made up the majority of such decisions. The 
question arises as to whether the decisions have applied the clause to find 
that women in general are degraded, dehumanised or demeaned, or whether 
this only applied to the actual women taking part in the depiction of the 
activity. The former interpretation is said to be a feminist mainstream view. 
A similar approach was criticised judicially in 1987 in relation to the 
Indecent Publications Tribunal as being impossible to apply because it could 
not be said that a representational view of women could denigrate all 
women.59 However, the Tribunal later adopted a similar approach to that 
criticised in using as a guideline to identify indecent material reference to 
depictions of sexual activity which demeaned or treated as inherently inferior 
any person or group of persons.60 The application of this test to women as a 
group has been identified as creating practical difficulties for the Tribunal 
and is said to have resulted in inconsistent decision making.6' 
The Act leaves open either approach, as s 3(3)(a)(iii) refers simply to 
sexual or physical conduct of a degrading or dehumanising or demeaning 
nature, while s 3(3)(c) refers to the degradation of 'any person'. The 
interpretational approach of the Office appears to be a mixture - of the seven 
decision summaries footnoted above62, five refer specifically to the actual 
woman or women involved in the depiction,63 while two refer to effects on 
women in general." The Board of Review in its first decision gave a clear 
indication of how the words 'degrades, dehumanises and demeans' are to be 
i n t e r ~ r e t e d . ~ ~  Referring to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (7th ed.) (an 
approach it rejected in the later New Truth decision) the Board defined 
'degrade' as 'bring into dishonour or contempt', 'dehumanise' as 'divest of 
human characteristics; make impersonal or machine-like' and 'demean' as 
'lower the dignity of'. It also stated that the meaning of the words is much 
broader than previous judicial criticism would allow, that New Zealand 
society has come to accept that women can be degraded, dehumanised and 
demeaned by representations showing behaviour of individual women, that 
the Act allows such arguments on representational viewpoints, and that proof 
is not required for this. 
Classification Register, August 1995, OFLC Ref 1161, Video 'The Golden Triangle'; 
September 1995, OFLC Ref 9500480, Video 'The Ultimate Gang Bang'. 
Classification Register, December 1995. OFLC Ref 9501833. 
Jeffries and Quilliam JJ in The Comptroller of Customs v Gordon and Gotch (1987) 6 
NZAR 469,471 and 483. 
Re "Penthouse (US)" Vol 19, No 5 and others [I9911 NZAR 289, 325. 
Caldwell op cit above, note 3, at 197. 
Note 56. 
Deluxe Playing Cards with Sucking, Videos: 'Stiff Competition 11', 'Harry Horndog 
Double Penetration Special', 'Bittes Latex No 2', and 'Lust Runner'. 
Videos: 'White Slavery', and 'Domination'. 
See above at note 21. 
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In this decision, the Board classified the video 'D.P. Women' as 
objectionable whereas the Office had classified it R18. In the video there 
were frequent shots of women's genital and anal areas, though infrequent 
shots showing their whole bodies or faces except in the act of servicing men, 
and there was a complete absence of shots showing people doing anything 
other than having sex. However, the Board was careful to note that it was not 
the depiction of sexual acts per se, such as double penetration, which 
degraded, dehumanised or demeaned. Such effect would depend on there 
being signs of withdrawal of consent, and signs of physical discomfort, pain 
or injury. There were such signs in this video and therefore s 3(3)(a)(iii) 
applied. As to s 3(3)(c), the video not only degraded, dehumanised and 
demeaned the women taking part in it, because the video represented the 
women in it as machine-like collections of body parts that existed for no 
other purpose than to gratify male sexual impulses, but because the women 
in the video shared the characteristics used to demean them with all women, 
women in general were degraded, dehumanised and demeaned. This was so 
even though it could be argued that the wording of the provision, in referring 
to 'any person', refers only to individuals. Therefore, the Board clearly 
articulated the approach seemingly followed by the Office that 
representational arguments can be used to interpret the words 'degrade, 
dehumanise and demean' in the Act, and confirmed the general requirements 
in relation to explicit sexual activity that there be consent, enjoyment and 
invol~ement .~~  
It is important to note that these subsections have also been applied by 
the Office to menh7 and  transsexual^.^^ However, a different approach appears 
to be taken to degradation of men than to degradation of women. A video 
focussing on S & M related activities depicting demeaning conduct which 
involved a man being ordered to lick the boots and latex underwear of a 
mistress, wearing a dog collar and leash, the use of whips, riding crops, and 
metal clamps, and the use of language that degraded the man involved, was 
classified R18 as the activity as presented was not seen as harmful to an 
adult audience.69 This seems almost to embrace the argument that it is not 
possible to sexually degrade or demean men. The Board seems to have 
endorsed this approach in its first decision, where it considered the video 
'D.P. Women' merely did men a disservice by portraying them in constant 
need of sexual gratification and as generally treating women with contempt. 
To summarise, despite the vagueness of the wording in these provisions, 
overall the Register offers no evidence that they have been used to ban 
explicit sexual depictions per se - as already noted, such depictions have 
generally been classified as R18 whether featuring heterosexual or gay 
sexual acts." The words 'degradation, dehumanising or demeaning' have 
66 In reviewing the video 'The Voyeur #2' in 1996 the Board stated that the provision would 
be satisfied if 'the female models were consistently filmed in a manner that reduced them to 
body parts, or if the men in the video recording were seen to treat, by way of words or 
actions, the female models as mere objects upon which to sexually gratify themselves, or if 
there was evidence of involuntariness or discomfort on the part of, or coercion against the 
female models'. Decision 8/96. 
67 Classification Register, June 1995, OFLC Ref 001092, Video Slick 'Cum Bath Bonanza' (a 
video slick depicting both men and women as body parts); July 1996, OFLC Ref 9500230, 
Magazine 'Assmasters #17' (close-ups of splayed labia and penile penetration dehumanised 
the men and women presented). 
68 Classification Register, November 1995, OFLC Ref 9400569 (a magazine containing a 
fetishised image of transsexuality in the context of dominance and submission). 
69 Classification Register, October 1995, OFLC Ref 9500453. 
70 It appears that very little lesbian material has been submitted, and even material using the 
word 'Lesbian' in a title may often turn out to be produced for male audiences. The video 
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consistently been used to ban or excise depictions involving lack of consent, 
enjoyment or involvement, the verbal punishment of a participant, or the 
reduction of the participants to a collection of mere body parts. It is hard to 
argue that depictions in the first two categories do not come within the 
legislative provisions. The third category has been contentious, but the Board 
of Review has settled the question of whether a representation can objectify 
an individual or member of a class. Such arguments are no longer confined 
to 'mainstream feminism', but are regarded by our censors as having entered 
mainstream consciousness. 
There are indications, however, that the words in s 3(3) may not be able 
to be applied consistently in all circumstances intended to be covered by the 
Act. In August 1996 the Office classified four street signs erected in 
Karangahape Road in Auckland." The painted signs, which had existed for 
some years, advertised the services of a strip club, and the products and 
services offered in three sex-shops. They depicted nude or semi-nude women 
in sexual poses and were displayed prominently on a busy road which was 
known to be a 'red-light' area, but also contained ordinary businesses. In 
each case the Office considered that s 3(3)(c) applied to the extent that 
women as a class were degraded and dehumanised. The signs were therefore 
objectionable. These decisions were reached after extensive consultation not 
only with the member of the public who made the application, and the 
owners of the signs, but also with a local bus company, seventh form 
students at Auckland Girl's Grammar School, a school close to the sign, staff 
and trustee representatives of the latter school and other local schools, 
members of the local business association and members of relevant councils. 
The Office took particular care to apply all the relevant criteria in ss 3(3) and 
3(4). It considered that the signs dealt with matters of sex, had a dominant 
effect of being prominent features in the surrounding street, had a significant 
and largely unavoidable impact in the area, had no artistic merit though 
might have a recognised kitsch value, and had no commercial, social and 
cultural merit which outweighed their negative effects. The Office performed 
a balancing exercise of the interests of the groups affected by the signs and 
concluded the availability of the publications was injurious to the public 
good. In each case it -gave particular weight to what it accepted as 
widespread public concern about the effects on schoolchildren associated 
with the signs, in particular the students of Auckland Girls' Grammar 
School.  he-latter had submitted that the signs expressed negative messages 
about women and girls, and impacted on the self-esteem of women and girls 
looking at the signs. The Office noted that these decisions were the first 
relating to publicly displayed signs and banning of them had raised new 
issues. It stated that if the publications were to be moved, their use could 
change, and they could be referred or submitted for reconsideration under the 
Act. 
In this case the Office was essentially performing a town-planning 
consent function using the inappropriate provisions of the Act as tools. 
Indeed the Auckland City Council acknowledged that it was looking for 
guidance on how the signs should be treated under its by-laws relating to 
signage. In weighing the interests of local groups which had complained 
against the commercial interests of the shop-owners who claimed a sort of 
'Lesbian Sleaze' consisting of four scenes of women engaged in sexual and SM activity as 
willing participants was classified as R18. Classification Register, September 1995, OFLC 
Ref 9500449. 
71 Classification Register, August 1996, OFLC Refs 9960068-70 (full decisions). 
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prescriptive right to advertise their businesses in an area acknowledged as a 
red-light area for years, the Office appeared to consider it important that the 
nature of Karangahape Road is changing. It accepted from the evidence that 
the businesses offering sexual services and products are now in the minority 
in the area and may be moving elsewhere. Therefore, ultimately the Office 
appeared to be saying that if the signs were displayed in a predominantly 
red-light area they might in fact not be objectionable on the grounds that they 
degraded, dehumanised or demeaned women as a class. Yet it is difficult to 
see why physical location should make any difference. Using the dictionary 
definition accepted by the Board of Review in its first deci~ion,~ '  the Office 
appears to be saying that women as a class may not be brought into 
dishonour and contempt, divested of human characteristics and made 
machine-like, and have their dignity lowered by a sign, as long as this occurs 
in surroundings where similar activities or depictions are taking place and 
are pursued for commercial gain. This can be called the 'only-to-be- 
expected' approach. Such depictions are only to be expected in a red-light 
area and therefore cannot degrade, dehumanise and demean. This suggests 
that clause 3(3)(c) can never have effect in a sex industry area. More 
nonsensically, if extrapolated to more typical publications, it suggests that as 
long as sexual depictions of women reducing them to no more than body 
parts or showing them being subject to punishment, or lacking consent or 
enjoyment are found within magazines, books, and films sold in sex shops, 
the restricted areas of video parlours, and even on the top shelves of the 
corner dairy, again such depictions are only to be expected because those 
places are set aside for such publications, and therefore cannot degrade, 
dehumanise or demean. But if this is so, it follows that if such depictions 
themselves simply appear within publications devoted predominantly to such 
depictions, the subsection must be completely ineffective. Such depictions 
are only to be expected in such magazines by those who choose to open the 
cover. In effect, s 3(3)(c) is left without any content at all. This unsustainable 
position arises because the Office, in dealing with the sex-shop signs, was 
really attempting to import some sort of offensiveness element into s 3(3) by 
suggesting that such signs in a real red-light area would be out-of-sight and 
out-of-mind, altering the weight to be given to commercial interests in such a 
case. Section 3(3) does not admit such an interpretation - offensiveness is 
only relevant to s 27, which provides for restrictions on display. 
There are further problems with the manner in which s 3(3)(c) is being 
applied. The focus on consent, enjoyment or involvement has produced a 
strange and contradictory ideology which arguably has resulted-in a state- 
endorsed view of acceptable sexuality. The magazine 'Climactic Scenes 
#103' was classified R18 by the Office in 1996.'' The publication was 
described as containing a portrayal of a woman as sexually insatiable and 
servile to the gratification of males. However, this was seen to be mitigated 
by the active stance she asserted, pouting and posing throughout. This view 
seems highly contrived and rather ~implistic. '~ It is unclear how the pouting 
and posing of a model can be seen to mitigate a visual inference that women 
are insatiable, servile and sexually available to men. Rather, it might simply 
be argued that the message sent is that women are actively and happily 
72 Decision 1/95, Video 'D P Women' 
73 OFLC Ref 9400867. 
74 AS a test, it is akin to the stupid 'limp-dick' approach used by the American courts in the 
1950s and 1960s. Any depiction of a flaccid penis was held not to be obscene. Any organ in 
a state of partial or full excitement failed the test. 
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insatiable, servile and sexually available to men. This might still be 
degrading, dehumanising or demeaning, perhaps more so. When the issue of 
consent. is reduced to the suggestion that if the participants look happy and 
assertive, they cannot be degraded, dehumanised or demeaned, the issue has 
not been dealt with fully. The result is that the state endorses a view of sex 
where one party can do anything to the other so long as the latter is smiling 
and apparently happy. Part of the difficulty arises because the question 
whether an individual has been degraded, dehumanised or demeaned is a 
different question from that whether a group, class or gender has been 
degraded, dehumanised or demeaned. The issue of consent may be relevant 
to the first question but not to the second. Because it has been accepted that 
depictions of an individual woman can degrade, dehumanise or demean 
women in general, it follows from this that a consent of the individual 
woman depicted should also be imputed to women in general, thus implying 
that all women consent to activity which would otherwise be degrading. 
Such a result is again, laughable. 
It is apparent then, that although the Office and the Board appear to have 
identified three clear categories of material which may be subject to the 
'degrades, dehumanises and demeans' test in s 3(3)(c), difficulties with 
applying the test remain. Depictions which involve lack of consent, 
enjoyment or involvement, the verbal punishment of a participant, or the 
reduction of a participant to a collection of mere body parts are likely to 
attract the interest of our censors. However, the Office has incorrectly used 
an approach apparently based on avoiding offensiveness in applying the 
subsection to street signs. The legislation seems ill-suited to such subject 
matter. Further, the effect of consent on the subsection has not yet been 
clearly articulated and has produced questionable results. Finally, the extent 
of representational arguments which will be accepted is unclear. 
It became apparent very quickly that the Office and the Board would 
have to deal regularly with Bill of Rights arguments put forward to avoid 
publications being classified as objectionable or made subject to restrictions. 
The relevant sections of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill) 
are: 
4. Other enactments not affected- 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the 
commencement of this Bill of Rights),- 
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to 
be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment- 
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of 
Rights. 
5. Justified limitations- 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill 
of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred- 
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Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other 
meaning. 
7. Attorney-General to report to Parliament where Bill appears to be inconsistent 
with Bill of Rights- 
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General 
shall,- 
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or 
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill,- 
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that 
appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights . . . 
14. Freedom of expression- 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, 
and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
Our growing body of Bill of Rights jurisprudence developed at High 
Court and Court of Appeal level, at times inconsistent and tentative, does not 
yet include a decision on the new regime established by the Act. The New 
Truth appeal will test the issues for the first time. Some general indications 
can be distilled from the cases however. First, freedom of expression has 
been defined to some degree. In Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand the 
Full Court of the High Court held that the freedom guaranteed is the right to 
everyone to express their thoughts, opinions and beliefs however unpopular, 
distasteful or contrary to the general opinion or to the particular opinion of 
others in the community.75 However, this freedom was noted to be 
intrinsicallv limited and not to include some forms of exmession. Three 
examples given were murder, threats or acts of violence, and defamation. It 
follows from this that threshold arguments could be made that pornography 
is not a form of ex~ression because it is devoid of content. a mere de~iction 
of desires and behaviours containing no opinion or information, and 
therefore cannot attract any protection under the Bill. The United States 
distinguishes between low-value and high-value speech when according it 
First Amendment protection. Obscene materials have been held not to count 
as ~peech. '~ Canada toyed with such an approach until the leading 1992 case 
of R v ~ u t l e r , ~ ~  where Sopinka J for the majority in the Supreme Court 
decided that magazines and videos containing hard core material depicted 
sexual activity which was part of the human experience, and such depiction 
had the potential of titillating some and informing others. The materials were 
therefore seen to convey ideas, opinions or feelings, which was expressive 
content. A similar view had been reached a year earlier by the New Zealand 
Indecent Publications Tribunal in Re "Penthouse (US)" Vol 19. No 5 and \ 1 
others,78 where sexually explicit magazines were held to convey, or attempt 
75 [I9941 lNZLR 48, 59. The majority of decisions involving consideration of s 14 do not 
attempt such definitions, the Court being content to move straight to the issue whether the 
particular act or thing in question is protected by freedom of expression as declared in the 
Rill 
76 G e k o t h  v United States, 354 US 476,481 (1957). 
77 (1992) 89 DLR (4th) 449,472. 
78 [I9911 NZAR 289, based in part on the Manitoba Queen's Bench decision in Butler (50 
CCC (3d) 97), reversed in the Court of Appeal (60 CCC (3d) 219) and reversed again in the 
Supreme Court. 
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to convey, meaning, and not to be violent forms of expression.79 That 
decision did not concern the effects of the Bill on the new regime. Therefore 
this general threshold question has yet to be tested to establish whether the 
materials subject to the Act prima facie fall within the scope of the guarantee 
in s 14 of the Bill. Proper consideration of the issue would involve 
examining the purpose of the protections in the Bill, and the nature of 
pornography itself. If pornography in general was found not to be speech, it 
would appear the operation of the Act could not be questioned on Bill of 
Rights grounds. But it seems likely that the Canadian approach would be 
compelling, for reasons which follow. 
A generous and purposive approach to the Bill has been accepted. In the 
leading Court of Appeal decision MOT v ~ o o r t "  Cooke P and Richardson J 
both referred to the need for a generous interpretation," and Hardie Boys J 
noted that the long title of the Bill demands for all its provisions a generous 
and purposive interpretation and that: 
While not a constitutional document, it is nonetheless an affirmation and a %cans of 
promoting principles which are fundamental to every constitutional instrument. 
Gault J concluded the rights affirmed in the Bill are to be given full effect 
and are not to be narrowly c~nstrued.~'  These dicta suggest that pornography 
would be found to be prima facie entitled to protection under s 14 of the Bill 
as a form of expression. 
Canadian authority is seen as highly persuasive in interpreting the Bill. 
Similarly, American authority and European Court of Human Rights 
decisions are seen as relevant." Reference is also made to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which is affirmed by New Zealand in 
the preamble to the Bill. Richardson J articulated the approach in ~ o o r t : ' ~  
Its [the Bill's] terms, in large measure, have been drawn from the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms so that Canadian decisions can be expected to assist in 
interpretation so long as there is borne in mind the different status enjoyed by the 
~ h a r t e r . ' ~  
In Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand the Full Court of the High Court 
said: 
The Bill of Rights is a recent enactment and the jurisprudence is developing gradually 
and case by case. As is customary in proceedings such as this, where the Bill of Rights 
is raised, reference has been made to decisions in other jurisdictions and particularly in 
Ca;ada where they have had a relatively lengthy period of discussion and consideration 
. . . 
Overseas authority is not adopted simplistically, however. In the latter case, 
the Court noted a number of matters which prevented immediate application 
of Canadian principles, and concluded that the approaches and principles 
Ibid, at 318-319. 
[I9921 3 NZLR 260. 
Ibid, 269 and 277. 
Ibid, 286. 
Ibid, 292. See also J Burrows, 'Freedom of the Press' in P A Joseph (ed), Essays on the 
Constitution (1995), 289; Adams on Criminal Law (1992), the Hon J Bruce Robertson (ed), 
Ch 10. 
See the judgments of Cooke P and Richardson J in Noort [I9921 3 NZLR 260, at 269,283. 
Op cit above, note 80. 
This reference is to the fact that the Canadian Charter is supreme law while the Bill is 
subject to the primacy of the New Zealand Parliament. 
I19941 1 NZLR 48,60. 
Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 7, 19961 
adopted there could helpfully be borne in mind modified appropriately for 
New Zealand  condition^.^^ The relevance of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and its associated jurisprudence has also been questioned 
where different words to those in the Bill are under c~nsideration.'~ In 
general, Canadian authority has considerable influence, and material from 
other jurisdictions is regarded as of assistance. Because of the combination 
of the generous approach taken to the rights set out in the Bill, and the 
persuasiveness of Canadian authority, it is likely that the Butler approach to 
the question whether pornography is a form of expression would be accepted 
were such issues to be raised. It would be instructive to have the matter dealt 
with fully, however. 
An important issue in relation to the Bill is how the operative sections 4, 
5 and 6 are to work together. The difficulty which arises is to give content to 
s 5 where legislation is being challenged as inconsistent with the Bill. If s 4 
is to operate first, then legislation which imposes a limit on a right in the Bill 
can apparently simply be applied without reference to s 5.  There is no need 
to apply established tests using s 5 to see if the limit is reasonable. This 
approach emphasises the initial words in s 5 making it subject to s 4, and was 
the approach taken by Cooke P and Gault J in Noort. It leaves s 5 the 
function of providing the Attorney-General with guidance in reporting on a 
new bill which appears inconsistent with the Bill of Rights under s 7, and of 
providing guidance for courts considering whether a common law doctrine or 
a particular decision of a person or body subject to the Bill breaches its 
provisions. The majority in Noort, Richardson, McKay and Hardie Boys JJ, 
took a different approach however. Richardson J (with whom McKay J 
agreed) appeared to accept that turning to s 5 first is logical, while Hardie 
Boys J read both ss 5 and 6 together to determine the limits of the relevant 
right and then considered whether the legislation could be interpreted 
consistently with the right as limited.90 
Some confusion about the order in which the sections are to be applied 
remains but it would appear desirable to take an approach which is not 
highly semantic and which takes account of the history of the legislation. 
Section 5 was originally intended to have considerable content and the 
circumstances of the late introduction of s 4 into the Bill establish that it was 
intended to have only the limited effect of ensuring that statutes passed prior 
to the Bill were not impliedly repealed and those passed after it were not to 
simply be made in~a l id .~ '  In any event, it seems that since Noort the Courts 
are taking the approach of the majority, which does give content to s 5 ,  
although some give closer attention to the various components which need to 
be satisfied to comply with the section than others. A recent example is 
88 Ibid, at 61- 62. 
89 See Eichelbaum CJ and Greig J in Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand, ibid, at 62-63, 
and McGechan J in Television New Zealand Ltd v Quinn [I9961 3NZLR 24, at 58. 
However, Lord Cooke, in the latter case, was not inclined to take such a rigid approach (at 
37). 
90 see also Adams on Criminal Law (1992), the Hon J Bruce Robertson (ed), Ch 10; W K 
Hastings, 'The Right to Protest Against Monarchism: Has O'Brien Come to New Zealand' 
(1996) Bill of Rights Bulletin 90. There is a very full judgment of Fisher J in the High 
Court in Herewini v MOT [I9931 747, in which the judge traverses the textual difficulties 
in some detail and concludes that the relevant order in which the sections should be applied 
is 4, 6, 5 but the appeal to the Court of Appeal was decided on other grounds with no 
consideration of this aspect of the lower court decision (Police v Smith and Herewini 
[I9941 2 NZLR 306). 
91 A similar view is put forward in Adams, ibid, Ch 10. 
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Zdrahal v Wellington City ~ o u n c i l ~ ~  where Greig J agreed with Hardie Boys 
J in Noort and read the three sections of the Bill as a whole. 
How is all of this relevant to decisions made by the Office and Board of 
Review under the new censorship legislation? It seems that if a decision is to 
be challenged by reference to ss 5 and 14 of the Bill of Rights, it would, if 
dealt with most rigorously, be subject to the following series of tests: 
1. Is the relevant section prescribed by law? This depends on whether or not 
it is so vague it cannot be applied. It may be so vague so as not to 
prescribe a limit at all, or it may be so imprecise it is not a reasonable 
limit. 
2. A reasonable limit may be demonstrably justified if the objectives of the 
legislation in question justify overriding the right in the Bill. 
3. There must be proportionality. This requires: 
the existence of a rational connection between the impugned 
measures and the objective; 
minimal impairment of the right or freedom; 
a proper balance between the effects of the limiting measures 
and the legislative objective. 
These steps were used in Butler, and few New Zealand decisions have 
articulated all of them. In Noort Cooke P accepted the vagueness component 
of the 'prescribed by law' test, but also thought the law must be adequately 
accessible so that a citizen could know the legal rules applicable in a given 
case.93 Both he and Gault J took the tests no further because of their view that 
s 5 had no application where s 4 applied. Hardie Boys J concentrated on 
making s 5 a workable mechanism. But it was Richardson J who most clearly 
gave New Zealand context to the Canadian approach. The judge endorsed the 
Canadian stance which accepts limits being prescribed by law if they are 
expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or result from necessary 
implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or its operating 
requirements. However, in relation to the latter, Richardson J noted as a 
minor qualification that New Zealand courts interpret statutes with a view to 
making them workable in any event.94 The judge then noted that the party 
seeking to rely on a provision which limits a right must show it is reasonable 
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. He openly 
acknowledged that this necessarily involved public policy analysis and value 
judgments on the part of the Courts which would probably involve 
consideration of all economic, administrative and social implications. Finally 
he proposed weighing four issues: 
1. the significance in the particular case of the values underlying the Bill of Rights 
Act; 
2. the importance in the public interest of the intrusion on the particular right protected 
by the Bill of Rights Act; 
92 [I9951 1 NZLR 700, at 710-711. As is common in the lower court decisions, the appellant 
did not appear to distinguish between challenging the legislation itself and challenging the 
decision made under it. In the latter case, there should be no difficulty applying s 5 as s 4 
will have no application. See also W K Hastings, 'The Right to Protest Against 
Monarchism: Has O'Brien Come to New Zealand', (1996) BORB 90, commenting on 
Braconov v Moss [I9961 1 NZLR 445, where Penlington J acknowledges the different 
approaches to the working sections but appears to apply s 4 last (453-456), again without 
making the distinction referred to above clear. Hastings calls the challenging of a decision 
where a statute does not itself offend: '[the activation of the Bill of Rights] at a sub-textual 
level' - the judge has to exercise discretion to decide whether words with a clear but 
subjective meaning are satisfied by the facts before him or her ( at 92). 
93 Op cit, above note 80, at 272. 
94 Op cit, above note 80, at 283. 
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3. the limits sought to be placed on the application of the Act provision in the 
particular case; 
4. the effectiveness of the intrusion in protecting the interests put forward to justify 
those limits.95 
The extent and degree to which the courts enter into this exercise varies.96 
This Butler/Noort test applies both where legislation itself is being 
challenged, and where it is an administrative decision (made under 
legislation) which is being challenged but the legislation itself does not 
~ f f e n d . ~ '  The difference is not very well articulated in the cases.98 The reason 
for this may be that it appears different parts of the test will be determinative 
depending on what is being challenged. It appears that if legislation itself is 
being challenged then the 'prescribed by law' test is most relevant. However, 
where a decision is being challenged, it appears the proportionality test is 
most relevant. But such general conclusions are incorrect. The tests should 
be applied to both. In RJR MacDonald Inc v Attorney General of ~ a n a d a ~ ~  
the Supreme Court of Canada applied the proportionality test to the federal 
Tobacco Products Control Act,''' and held by majority that provisions 
banning advertising, restricting trademark usage, and requiring mandatory 
package warnings were inconsistent with the Charter and therefore invalid.I0' 
Butler of course applied all parts of the test to legislation. But the test can be 
applied to individual administrative decisions as was done by the Indecent 
Publications Tribunal in Re "Penthouse US" Vol 19, No 5 and others,''' 
discussed in more detail below. In summary, in any given case, a party could 
choose to attack a decision made by an official to whom the Bill of Rights 
applies which affects her or him, in two ways - either by directly challenging 
the statute as being in breach of the Bill, or by challenging the decision made 
by the official as in breach, or both. Challenging the statute does not prevent 
it having effect, because of s 4 of the Bill. However, such challenge is in fact 
required if s 5 is to be given content, as set out by the majority in ~ o o r t . " ~  
Therefore, a censorship decision made either by the Office or the Board of 
Review, faces challenge on either ground - that the Act breaches the Bill, or 
that a particular censorship decision breaches the Bill. 
95 Op cit, above note 80, at 284. 
96 Cf Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand [I9941 1 NZLR 48, at 63-64; Zdrahal v 
Wellington City Council [I9951 1 NZLR 700, at 710-711, and Braconov v Moss [I9961 1 
NZLR 445, at 454-455. 
97 A sub-textual decision. See note 92 above. 
98 For example, in Noort, Cooke P finds no inconsistency between the Bill of Rights and the 
relevant sections of the Transport Act 1962 (applying s 4 of the Bill first). At this point he 
appears to be treating the matter as one of challenge to the transport legislation (at 273- 
274). However, the President then finds that the evidential tests in question had been 
obtained in breach of the Bill. The violations of Bill rights appear to be the decisions of 
officers to take the tests without informing the subjects of their right to legal advice. 
Therefore, at this point, it appears that the judge is treating the matter as one of challenge to 
an administrative decision (at 274). But if this is so, then Cooke P should have applied s 5 
of the Bill using its relevant components to test the limits imposed by the application of the 
transport legislation, as s 4 has no relevance in such a case. This he does not do. In contrast 
to this, Richardson J is quite clear that the claim is not one of rights being infringed by a 
statutory provision, but of a challenge to acts done by a person in performance of a power 
or duty conferred or imposed by law (at 281). 
99 (1995) 127 DLR (4th) 1. 
loo SC 1988, c. 20. 
I O I  See Selene Mize, 'The Word "Dog" Never Bit Anyone - the Tobacco Advertising Ban and 
Freedom of Expression' (1995) 8 OLR 425, where similar arguments are made for New 
Zealand. 
102 Op cit, above note 78, at 317-329. 
I03 The majority in Noort avoided the appearance of wasting time in applying s 5 because the 
transport legislation, as limited by s 5, was found to be consistent with the Bill. Therefore 
there was no reason to apply s 4. 
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The Office has taken a consistent approach to freedom of expression 
arguments. Where s 3(2) is found to apply, the view is taken that that section 
cannot be given an interpretation which is consistent with the Bill. Therefore 
the material is deemed objectionable and cannot be made available in any 
form. The submitter of the computer disks referred to abovelD4 argued that the 
disks were for his personal use and for use with respect to hisprofessional 
interests in censorship of computer networks and bulletin board systems. 
However, because the disks were found to contain material which fell under 
s 3(2) of the Act, these freedom of expression arguments were ineffective. 
Further, although freedom of expression was recognised in a case where an 
interested party stated he simply intended to sell and distribute a video in the 
normal manner through video retail outlets, it was trumped by the fact that 
the publication fell under s 3(2) criteria.'05 Where s 3(2) does not apply, 
availability is approached with care, so as not to overstep the reasonable 
limits requirement of the Bill. For example, in dealing with the 
Mapplethorpe photographs, the Office felt that the wider public interest was 
better served by the publications being made available than not, and, noting 
the merit of the works and the controlled circumstances in which they could 
be made available in an art gallery, gave an R18 classification which it felt 
still recognised the explicitness of the depictions. Again, in June 1995, the 
Office classified 57 of 265 issues of the magazine 'Ribald' as objectionable 
unless availability was restricted to the particular individual concerned, who 
had stated that the magazines were part of his personal collection. 
The Board of Review has confirmed that the Bill applies to its 
 decision^,'^^ and endorsed the approach previously taken by the Indecent 
Publications Tribunal in Re "Penthouse (US)" Vol 19, No 5 and others.'07 In 
that case, the Tribunal was dealing with a decision to classify three 
magazines R18. In assessing those classifications in relation to s 14 of the 
Bill, the Tribunal asked whether the objective of the indecent publications 
legislation related to concerns which were pressing and substantial in a free 
and democratic society, and also applied a proportionality test.'08 It found 
that the regulation of sexually explicit depictions was a pressing and 
substantial concern in New zealand, that the classification was rationally 
connected to the statutory objective of regulating such depictions, and was 
proportional because it was within the scope of the legislation, was squarely 
based on evidence given at the hearing, and limited freedom of expression 
only to the extent necessary to protect society from the injurious effects.Iw 
The Tribunal also considered the question whether the classification was 
prescribed by law. The classification was based on criteria laid down in the 
legislation but also on guidelines which made up a 'tripartite test' distilled 
from previous  decision^."^ These guidelines were argued by counsel for 
Penthouse International as inaccessible and vague as they were not in the 
statute itself. The Tribunal was inclined to accept such an argument if a 
decision had been made based on the guidelines alone. But because its 
classification was based on specific statutory criteria and on new guidelines 
which had been recently clarified and were therefore accessible and precise, 
104 Note 36. 
105 Classification Register, December 1995, OFLC Ref 9500441. 
106 Decision 1/95. 
107 [I9911 NZAR 289. 
108 Using criteria summarised in the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench in Butler (1990) 50 
CCC (3d) 97. 
109 Op cit, above note 107, at 320. 
110 Op cit, above note 107, at 325. 
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mean that Parliament's intention could not then be carried out. The Board 
could not see how the New Zealand parliament could be said to have passed 
a law that cannot be justified in a free and democratic society while making 
that law a key provision in government policy. In any event, the Board 
considered that s 4 of the Bill directed the Board to enforce s 3 of the Act. 
Although the Board briefly considered Parliament's intention in passing the 
Act, and dealt with the question of 'reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society' with a single 
reference to the Re Penthouse decision, it did not rigorously apply the 
Butler/Noort tests. In particular, issues of proportionality were not dealt with 
at all. Further, the Board did not clearly differentiate between whether the 
legislation itself offends the Bill, or the classification decision. It is to these 
questions that I now turn. 
The first question to be answered is whether the provisions of the Act 
itself breach the Bill of Rights. It could be argued that parts of s 3 are so 
vague it cannot be applied consistently. Therefore, as noted by Cooke P in 
~ o o r t " '  a citizen does not know the legal rules applicable in a given case 
because the law is not accessible. Consistently with Richardson J in the same 
case, any limits on rights in the Bill are not expressly provided for in statute 
or regulation because it is impossible to know what is provided for. Arguably 
the 'promotes and supports, or tends to promote or support' test in s 3(2) 
offends in this manner. It is not possible to know what this means in any 
given case. The argument may be made that understanding is made possible 
when the phrase is teamed up with one of the activities described in ss 2(a) - 
(f), but the cases show this to be incorrect. In the Mapplethorpe decisions, 
the meaning of the words 'promote and support' in relation to art was 
determined by the acceptance by the Office of an argument favoured by 
some experts in the art world. Therefore, where art is being classified, the 
most a citizen can do to avoid restriction where a s 3(2) activity is depicted is 
hope to produce a convincing expert who will sway the censor. The T-shirt 
decision of the Office and the New Truth decision show that when looking at 
the question of promotion and support, both the Office and the Board have 
imported some context elements in some circumstances into the s 3(2) tests 
where context is not meant to feature. Also, in its first decision, the Board 
used a dictionary definition to define the words 'degrading, dehumanising 
and demeaning' in s 3(3)(a)(iii) and s 3(3)(c), which is a common approach 
used by the Office for the promotes and supports test. Thus, a citizen could 
well be entitled to assume that such an approach would be used to interpret s 
3(2). However, the Board specifically rejected the dictionary approach in the 
New Truth decision and used an arbitrary test of its own in relation to the 
promotes and supports test, and  advertisement^."^ Similarly, the 
Karangahape Road street signs decision demonstrates difficulty with the 
degrading, dehumanising and demeaning provision in s 3(3)(c) in that some 
sort of offensiveness element was imported into the section though not 
provided for."9 These serious inconsistencies cast doubt upon the notion that 
either of these phrases is easily interpreted and applied. They have not been 
interpreted consistently and are therefore inaccessible. It must of course be 
recognised that it is inevitable that phrases and words incapable of absolute, 
technical definition are used in legislation and fall to be interpreted by judges 
117 Op cit, above note 80. 
118 See the analysis in Part IV, Section 3 above. 
I19 See Part IV, Section 5 above. 
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on a daily basis.'20 Censorship as a form of regulation is a paradigm example 
where this will occur and should accordingly be tolerated to some degree. 
However, it is arguable that these decisions reveal that ss 3(2) and 
3(3)(a)(iii) and 3(3)(c) of the Act do not yield an intelligible standard 
whereby a citizen can judge whether her or his behaviour is in accordance 
with the law. This breaches the Bill of Rights. 
The Board considered the notion of vagueness in the New Truth decision 
and noted that the Human Rights Committee in its consideration of the 
Report submitted by New Zealand under Article 40 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressed concern over the vagueness 
of the term "objectionable publication", recommending a more specific 
definition."' However, the Board was able to ignore this argument by noting 
that the Attorney General's report to Parliament under s 7 of the Bill made 
no mention of inconsistency between s 3(2) of the Act and s 14 of the Bill, 
and by noting that s 3(2) was one of the cornerstones of the legislation, a key 
provision implementing government policy. Therefore the Board concluded 
Parliament cannot have intended to pass a key provision which was not 
justified in a free and democratic society. This incredulous argument is very 
weak. The report to Parliament was prepared by the Crown Law Office and 
was one of the first to be vrevared under the section. The Devartment of 
L .  
Justice was recognised as having the best experience to prepare such reports 
as its existing functions included advising the Cabinet Legislation Committee 
about the content of draft bills.   ow ever a conflict of interest arose where 
the Department was promoting its own legislation, and in such a case, it was 
agreed the Crown Law Office would prepare the report. The report prepared 
in this case was prepared by Crown Law without much, if any, previous 
experience and during a period when the procedure was arguably temporary 
and tentative. It is therefore entirely possible that the report was not as 
comprehensive and rigorous as it might have been. Further, in answer to the 
point raised about Parliament's intention, in fact, the Attorney General, Paul 
East, when reporting to Parliament on the censorship legislation, pointed out 
that he considered clause 121 (now s 123) of the Act imposed retrospective 
criminal liability without the provision of a defence relating to lack of 
knowledge or reasonable belief for a simple possession charge, and therefore 
breached s 26 of the Bill of Rights which forbade conviction for an offence 
which was not an offence at the time it occurred.'22 In spite of this report, 
Parliament passed the Act. In other words, Parliament passed legislation it 
knew full well or at least believed offended against the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights Act. This makes nonsense of the reasoning used by the Board in 
the New Truth decision to reject suggestions that the Act breaches the Bill of 
Rights. 
The next question which must be asked about the provisions in the Act is 
whether the reasonable limits it contains are demonstrably justified by the 
objectives of the Act thereby justifying overriding freedom of expression. In 
Re "Penthouse US" Vol 19, No 5 and otherslZ3 the Indecent Publications 
Tribunal thought that the regulation of sexually explicit depictions was a 
pressing and substantial concern in New Zealand. Clearly, the New Truth 
120 See Sopinka J in Butler 89 DLR (4Ih) 449,475 (1992). 
121 Decision 3/96, at 17. 
122 (1992) 532 NZPD 12764-12765. In fact it is arguable that the clause did not breach the Bill. 
The Act provides in s 29 that the Courts are to refer publications to the Office for 
classification and trial is adjourned until the matter is determined. Courts often have to 
determine the quality of conduct after the fact, and this is not interpreted as retrospectivity. 
123 Op cit, above note 107, at 321. 
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decision of the Board would support arguments that at the time the Act was 
passed, Parliament considered that the harms of making, supply and 
possession of objectionable publications justified limiting freedom of 
expression. That aside, the question has to be whether there is a discernible 
object, and whether that object still justifies reasonable limits on freedom of 
expression. Given the arguments made above about vagueness, it could be 
said for those provisions that the object is unclear. But assuming it is clear, it 
seems likely a court would find reasonable limits are justified. The 
proportionality test should determine what limits are reasonable. 
Accordingly, the questions which make up the proportionality test should 
now be considered. 
Does a rational connection exist between s 3 and the objectives of the 
Act? An answer in the affirmative requires assuming that the objective of s 3 
is clear - that the vagueness arguments set out above are rejected. Assuming 
that, a question which could be asked is whether the complete ban provided 
for in s 3(2) is justified by the objective. That would require revisiting the 
issues which motivated Parliament in specifying the activities it wanted 
banned completely in s 3(2). An issue which should be addressed under this 
heading is whether it was rational for Parliament to ban absolutely the 
depiction of an activity which is not criminal. Lianne Dalziel, Labour MP for 
Christchurch Central, pointed out during the third reading of the bill which 
became the Act that all of the categories in what is now s 3(2) of the Act 
mention illegal acts except one, which refers to the use of urine or excrement 
in association with degrading or dehumanising conduct or sexual  ond duct.''^ 
Arguably a complete ban of depictions of an otherwise lawful activity cannot 
be rationally connected to the dominant objective of s 3(2) which can only be 
that of banning depictions of criminal activities. 
Is there minimal impairment of freedom of expression? The strict liability 
offence in s 123 can be said to more than minimally impair the freedom. It is 
no defence that the defendant had no knowledge or no reasonable cause to 
believe that the publication to which the charge relates was objectionable. 
This allows a defence of no knowledge of possession, but arguably still goes 
too far. Even our drug possession offences are not strict liability in this 
sense. Is pornography more evil than drugs? It would be rare that a defence 
of no knowledge or reasonable cause would be made out and the object of 
the legislation would not be defeated by the introduction of such a defence. 
Finally, is there a proper balance between the effects of the limiting 
measures and the legislative objective? Again, assuming that objective is 
clear, all of the arguments made above can be marshalled to suggest that 
there is an imbalance. Therefore, applying the Butler/Noort tests, it is 
possible to argue that parts of the Act do breach the Bill of Rights. 
Assuming all or any of these arguments are correct, there is no doubt that 
the practical effect of successfully establishing legislative breach of the Bill 
of Rights in such a way is negligible because s 4 of the Bill requires that the 
offending provisions be applied in any event. But the symbolic effect could 
be profound. The effect of a judge of the High Court or the Court of Appeal 
specifying the ways in which the Act offends against the Bill of Rights 
would bring home to the public mind the weaknesses in the legislation and 
focus the issues for further public debate. The result might be law reform 
based on informed discussion of the constitutional issues in a country 
previously not fully aware of the nature of constitutional rights. 
124 S 3(2)(d). See (1993) 537 NZPD 17491, at 17497. 
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A similar process should be applied to individual censorship decisions. 
On this basis it could be argued the New Truth decision offends because it is 
so vague its limits cannot be determined. It is unclear how far it extends, or 
what form the suggested defence of mistake may take. The complete ban it 
imposes is unreasonable in relation to the supposed objectives of the Act. It 
is not rationally connected to the objectives of the Act because it is arbitrary, 
based on an unrealistic view of editorial control and because it is based on an 
interpretation of s 3(2) which appears to consider context, if only to a limited 
extent. It does not minimally impair freedom of expression because it 
resulted in the complete banning of an edition of a newspaper which was two 
years old at the time of the decision, and because the offending 
advertisements took up a very tiny proportion of the publication. Because the 
result has been that coded words appear to be more dangerous than explicit 
pictures, and because the decision will have a chilling effect on what 
advertisements magazines accept for publication, there is an imbalance 
between the effects of this decision and the objectives of the Act. Similarly, 
the T-shirt decision appears to offend the proportionality test because it is 
not rationalised from the criteria in the Act, importing as it does context. 
This would also apply to the street sign decision which appears to be based 
on offensiveness. Both these decisions could also be argued as not minimally 
impairing freedom of expression and having a disproportionate chilling 
effect. In all of these decisions, s 4 of the Bill has no effect, and breach could 
result in invalidity of the original decision. The New Truth decision in 
particular appears indefensible. It is clearly wrong and should be overruled 
completely. The newspaper might fall to be reclassified under s 3(3), 
however any value deriving from this seems rather specious with the passing 
of time. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
New Zealand's new comprehensive censorship regime is well established 
and is generating an increasing number of decisions. The empowering 
legislation gives considerable discretion to our new censors. However, fears 
that the appointment process would result in non-representative censorship 
bodies with bias towards fundamentalism or radicalism appear misguided at 
this juncture. Both the Office of Film and Literature Classification and the 
Board of Review are administered by individuals who have varied but 
relevant professional and ethnic backgrounds, not unlike the backgrounds of 
those who were employed to censor publications under the previous regimes. 
In particular, there appears to be an abundance of legal expertise. There is a 
gender imbalance in that women outnumber men significantly, however. 
There is no doubt that on a day-to-day basis, the Office deals with the 
standard, explicit, heterosexual pornography created for the male consumer 
which makes up the majority of its work, in an efficient and rational manner 
which is probably soundly based in law. It essentially labels this material and 
provides for its manner of display and sale. But looking at decisions made in 
the first two years of our new censorship regime, one cannot help but be left 
with an uneasy feeling about decisions which allow the state to regulate what 
items of clothing may look like, what publishers and editors may do and 
what street signs may depict. More material is being censored than under the 
old tripartite system. This follows from the more inclusive wording of the 
new legislation, but also from the manner in which both bodies are 
interpreting the discretionary powers which they have been given. It is 
clearly arguable that parts of ss 3 and 123 of the Films, Videos and 
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Publications Classification Act 1993 breach the Bill of Rights even though s 
4 of the Bill does not allow legislative provisions to be invalidated. There 
have also been a number of significant decisions both from the Office and 
the Board which are inconsistent and arbitrary. As such they too breach the 
Bill of Rights and are invalid. What follows from this? 
It is to be hoped that the courts will continue to take an approach to s 5 of 
the Bill which will fully test our censorship legislation. The symbolic effect 
of confronting the inconsistencies in the Act is considerable and it is 
therefore essential that our courts do not allow the existence of s 4 to pre- 
empt proper interpretation of the Bill. As a society, New Zealand is 
becoming increasingly aware of constitutional rights, and it is a mark of a 
more sophisticated society that our courts continue to breathe life into the 
Bill of Rights. Whatever position is held as regards the desirability of 
censorship, it is essential that New Zealanders be reminded what sort of 
censorship system they have, how it works and whether it threatens 
fundamental constitutional rights. 
However, to note that parts of our censorship legislation breach our Bill 
of Rights is not to argue that dealing with the inconsistencies by eliminating 
legislative discretions altogether would solve all of these problems. It is 
accepted that censorship legislation, to work at all, must retain some 
discretionary elements. This survey has shown that combining discretionary 
elements with non-discretionary elements creates tension and in some cases, 
has meant that censorship cannot be applied in meaningful ways. The Chief 
Censor has made a recent statement which has implications for this state of 
affairs. Concerned with the increasing workload of the Office, she has 
suggested a law change which would automatically classify depictions of sex 
with children or bestiality as objectionable, in order to avoid the time- 
consuming task of applying the promotes and supports test.'" Such a 
response should be strongly resisted as unworkable and undesirable. Quite 
apart from transferring the weight of definitional arguments to the question 
of what is child pornography or bestiality, it would surely result in 
censorship decisions which cannot be tested and which have disproportionate 
effects in terms of freedom of expression. If the legislation is to be retained, 
reform efforts should focus on correcting the anomalies in ss 3 and 123, and 
on training our censors to interpret the provisions correctly. If a consistent 
dictionary definition of the promotes and supports test cannot be established 
and maintained (either by definition in the legislation or by clearly 
articulated guidelines) then consideration should be given to the question 
whether s 3(2) of the Act should place all of the weight of the censorship 
decision on that particular test. It may be that the section would be made 
more workable if context is allowed to be taken into account to a limited 
extent, provided for in the legislation. Further, although one of the virtues of 
New Zealand's new censorship regime was said to be its comprehensiveness, 
perhaps it is too comprehensive. If the words 'degrading, dehumanising and 
demeaning' cannot be applied to street signs without importing tests more 
relevant to town planning, the question to be asked is whether censorship 
legislation is the appropriate vehicle for regulation of every type of 
publication. The focus of reform should be to make the legislation workable, 
not laughable. This survey has shown that at present, some of the results are 
laughable. 
125 Kathryn Paterson, making a submission to the Commerce and Commercial Law Reform 
Select Committee on the Technology and Crimes Reform Bill on 31 July 1996. 
Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 7, 19961 
There are those who maintain that censorship can never be applied in 
meaningful ways. However, if it is to be applied, then at the very least, it 
should be applied consistently, and, since New Zealand now has a Bill of 
Rights, then it should be applied consistently with our constitutional rights. 
But technology is beginning to render questions of ideology and legality 
largely redundant. The Chief Censor has commented for the second year in a 
row that the most significant challenge for the Office will be keeping abreast 
of new technologies which both change the sorts of publications that are 
subject to the Act and the complexity of the work.lZ6 An increasing 
proportion of our censors' time is spent dealing with publications on or for 
use in the Internet. Similarly, the new censorship unit of the Department of 
Internal Affairs and the Inspectors of Publications working for it nationally 
spend the majority of their time detecting and prosecuting for possession of 
computer porn.''' The issue is rapidly changing from what is to be censored 
and how, to whether censorship is possible at all. In such a world, education 
may be the key to combating perceived harms. 
Note: During the publication process, in January 1997, the Board issued 
its decision on an appeal of the Karangahape Road sign decisions. By a 
majority of 4:2 it held that both signs should be unrestricted, and that issues 
of offensiveness should be dealt with by the local planning authority.'*' 
126 See Annual Report of the Office, 1996, 11 - 12. 
127 The unit was established in July 1996. There are two Inspectors in Auckland, two with the 
National Manager in Wellington and one in Christchurch covering the whole of the South 
Island. Most of the objectionable material comprises child pornography. The Inspectors 
work closely with the police and the Customs Department. 
128 Decision 1/97, 24 January 1997. 
